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I. INTRODUCTIONL EGAL CASES INFUSED with arcane scientific or technical
acts are among the most difficult for fact finders to resolve.
Untrained judges and juries must sometimes decide between
two equally plausible versions of technical truth. To place this
onus on fact finders who lack the requisite background in the
art or science is burden enough; to additionally expose them to
contradictory expert interpretations of these technical facts
merely provides the illusion of fairness in many cases.
Substantial fairness is more likely to be achieved when the ju-
dicial setting assures that fact finders understand the facts upon
which they must make a decision. Presently our judicial system
allows the parties to utilize expert witnesses to explain technical
facts. But the system does little to help the fact finders resolve
the ambiguities inherent in the adversarial presentation. This
system is tolerable when fact finders are called upon to decide
the nature and quantum of conduct necessary to meet a stan-
dard of due care in ordinary activities. But as familiarity with
the subject matter or protocols of a specialized field decreases,
there is a heightened danger that lay fact finders will be unable
to correctly resolve the ambiguity.' For present purposes, this
Article will refer to the foregoing hypothesis as the "ambiguity of
technical facts problem" or simply as the "technical problem."
Where the ill-effects of the technical problem can be empirically
demonstrated, the judicial system should take due note; The
system should also be hospitable to reform where these effects
can be remedied with simple structural changes.
This Article develops data tending to show that on an aggre-
gate basis there exists a significant variance between aviation
tort action outcomes and the results predicted by an independ-
ent standard of "expertise." 2 It attributes this difference in out-
' The notion that this ambiguity is resolvable rests on the premise that some
scientific knowledge or technical propositions are not seriously arguable, and
that there is only one correct resolution. In this connection, Steven Goldberg
observed: "There is in modem America a scientific community capable of form-
ing a consensus on technical scientific issues. There is therefore something that
can usefully be thought of as scientific expertise." Steven Goldberg, The Central
Dogmas of Law and Science, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 371, 372 (1986). To illustrate the
implications of this, Goldberg adds, "It is barely possible to be a member in good
standing of the American scientific community today if you disbelieve in evolu-
tion or believe in laetrile. It is impossible to be a member if you hold both views."
Id. at 373.
2 "Variance" as used here refers only to a difference between the two out-
comes, not to variance as the term is understood and used in parametric statistics.
578
A96 TION TORTS
comes mainly to the operation of the technical problem (i.e.,
the difficulty inherent in resolving the ambiguity imposed by the
adversarial presentation of technical facts). This Article also
links the technical problem to another problematic factor-the
propensity of fact finders to resolve ambiguities in favor of the
injured claimant at greater than expected rates.
According to the selection effect theory, propounded by
George Priest and Benjamin Klein, the overall expected plaintiff
win rate should be approximately fifty percent.3 Yet recent work
has shown that in several categories of personal injury actions,
including "airplane personal injury," plaintiff recovery rates ex-
ceed the predictions of the selection effect theory.4 This Article
argues that the operation of the technical problem essentially
liberates fact finders to impose outcomes that the neutral expert
would not predict. Furthermore, decisional accuracy and relia-
bility in the technical cases can be improved by certain changes.
A judicial system unable to deal competently with the technical
problem should adopt some of the methods of the inquisitory
style of judicial fact finding. This might mean, inter alia, provid-
ing fact finders with all the relevant information concerning the
case, not just the versions of the parties.
One important thematic obstacle preventing neutrality in our
current fact-finding regime is the "adversary ideology" that is im-
bedded in our legal culture. The central premise of this ideol-
ogy is that in a free and fair contest of adversaries, the truth will
prevail. But this ideology actually places process values ahead of
truth values. By maintaining the "champion of facts" myth, our
adversary ideology sacrifices "truth" for an uncontaminated pro-
3 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984). The authors' thesis was that litigants account for any
anticipated pro-plaintiff bias in their selection of cases for trial. With this in
mind, many defendants will settle. Cases that are tried should then distribute
outcomes evenly.
4 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Tran:-
scending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1137 (1992). The authors found
that in five of six types of personal injury cases-airplane personal injury, marine
personal injury, motor vehicle, products, and medical-plaintiff recovery rates
exceeded fifty percent. With ajudge as the fact finder, for example, plaintiff win
rates ranged up to a high of sixty-nine percent in motor vehicle torts. Id.
The authors did not test their discrete 'Judge" and 'jury" rates for statistical
significance since their principal focus was on variance between the judge and
jury. Their study also excluded cases in which the government was the defend-
ant. Therefore, the scholarship has yet to describe the behavior of judges in
respect to the government-as-defendant variable, as in a Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) case. See discussion, infra note 13.
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cess.5 When dealing with facts of everyday experience, this ide-
ology does not unduly interfere with an approximation of truth;
if its central premise is accurate, it advances that goal. But our
ideology is not necessarily equal to the task when the facts or
canons of the case are unfamiliar.
One thesis of this Article is that the more esoteric the facts,
the stronger the influence of the technical problem and the less
likely that an informed verdict will be reached, even when ex-
perts are used. Consequently, it is arguable that such a verdict is
less likely to be just. Even where the main issue is not a matter
of scientific knowledge but one of understanding rules of con-
duct in a specialized field, the technical problem can exist. In
such a case, the problem arises not just from the necessity to
decide esoteric facts but from an application of a rule determin-
ing liability. Where the rule is embodied in a law, or regulation
with force of law, our legal system often permits attribution of
negligence as a matter of law. Indeed, this "per se" approach to
negligence is the law in many jurisdictions. This method of im-
posing liability can result in a particularly egregious form of the
technical problem-an application of the rule that works at
cross purposes with the rule's rationale or policy.
Aviation is a technical field bound by a tight web of rules. As
such, aviation provides a host of opportunities for both forms of
the technical problem. Extensive literature highlights on the
tendency for aviation tort actions to produce outcomes counter
to what would be predicted by a neutral and informed view of
the facts.6 Until now, however, there has been no attempt to
empirically test any hypothesis relating to the incidence of the
technical problem in aviation tort actions. This Article uses the
reports of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on
aviation accident causation to assess aviation tort action out-
5 Ellen Sward argues that our adversary ideology is so ingrained in the Ameri-
can legal culture that it is difficult to discuss its failings with lawyers and jurists.
See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversay System, 64 IND.
LJ. 301, 301 (1988-1989). She argues that the myth of its effectiveness is only
maintained by the system's engraftment of some nonadversary features. Id. at
354. She includes modem liberalized discovery, which in principle violates the
ideological rationale of litigant autonomy and control; the use of masters and
court-appointed experts, which violates the "passive arbiter" ideological rationale;
and the creation of special courts for dealing with specialized fact situations and
types of claims (e.g., bankruptcy; tax, international trade, probate, patent ap-
peals, etc.). Id.
6 For an abbreviated review of relevant commentary, see infra Section IV.
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comes.7 The non-trivial variance between this independent
standard and some sample case outcomes tends to substantiate
the charges of the commentators.8 The following section re-
counts a case that is of independent historical interest to avia-
tion litigators and provides an illustration of how the technical
problem can distort the path of the law.
II. A PARADIGM CASE
On the morning of November 1, 1949, an Eastern Air Lines
DC-4 and a P-38 fighter plane, piloted by a Bolivian Air Force
pilot on a test flight, were simultaneously approaching the
Washington National Airport to land. The P-38 pilot overtook
the DC-4 from above and behind and rammed it, cutting the
DC-4 in two, killing all aboard: Miraculously, the Bolivian pilot
survived. After his plane plunged into the Potomac River, he
was rescued. Although the Bolivian pilot was under the ostensi-
ble control of the Washington Airport tower operators, testi-
mony showed that he was probably either too distracted with
alleged engine problems or was insufficiently proficient in Eng-
lish to respond properly to, or obey, the local controller's in-
structions. The tower controller had issued several urgent
warnings to the P-38 pilot that he was approaching dangerously
close to the DC-4 from behind. All warnings were ignored. The
Bolivian testified that he was on his "final" approach and that he
believed he had been cleared to land. The undisputed facts
showed that he had interpreted a standard sequencing phrase
("You are number two to land") as landing clearance.9 He testi-
fied that he could not see ahead because an airplane design de-
ficiency limited forward visibility, accounting for his not seeing
the DC-4. This excuse strains credulity in the extreme. 10
7 See infra Section V.
8 The statistics of this small-sample data aggregation are adduced as suggestive
only. The sample size was too small for testing with confidence intervals.
9 Even if he had been correct in his assumption that he had a landing clear-
ance, he still violated at least two fundamental precepts of aviation embodied in
regulations: (i) the always applicable "see and avoid" rule and (ii) the obligation
of the overtaking aircraft to give way to an aircraft ahead and below in the land-
ing pattern. 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b), (f) (1995). Both rules are codified as federal
regulations known as the federal aviation regulations, or FARs. For a discussion
of the FARs, see infra note 52. Thus, the Bolivian had no defense, especially in
consideration of the facts elucidated in the succeeding note.
10 According to military historians, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning was one of
the most highly successful aerial. combatants of World War II, a fact indicative of
excellent cockpit visibility. See RENt J. FRANCILLON, AMERICAN FIGHTERS OF
1996]
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A. SIGNIFICANCE OF EASTERN AIR LINES
The case of Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co.11 is best known
to aviation lawyers, not for this bizarre set of facts, but for the
rule that courts may entertain claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) against government air traffic controllers for
negligence in the performance of their duties. 12 The govern-
ment argued that these kinds of government duties were subject
to the discretionary function exception (DFE) of the FTCA. 13
After Eastern Air Lines, however, there was no doubt that air traf-
fic controllers had no discretion to be negligent in the perform-
ance of their duties. So notorious is this case, in the FTCA
context at least, that most, if not all, commentary on the subject
of air traffic controller liability begins and ends with citation to
it.
14
The facts in the case are interesting, but of even greater curi-
osity are the interpretations that the judge and jury gave these
facts. 15 Their interpretations supply some ready illustrations of
the inherent problems in interpreting highly technical or spe-
cialized facts and in treating them fairly. The case also illus-
WORLD WAR II 3, 47 (C.W. Cain ed., 1971). Additionally, the most aerial victories
achieved by an American fighter pilot during the War were notched by top ace,
Captain Richard I. Bong, flying P-38s in the Pacific. U.S. AIR FORCE HisToRicAL
DmSION, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 80 (Alfred Goldberg ed.,
1974). There is no better testimony to the plane's excellent cockpit visibility.
1 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd 350 U.S. 907 (1955), modified, 350 U.S. 962
(1956).
12 The FTCA, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) & 2671-
2680 (1988)), overturns the common law rule of sovereign immunity in order to
provide redress to persons harmed by the negligence of government employees.
is Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988), the DFE provides that the United
States will not be liable under the FTCA on "[a]ny claim based upon an act or
omission of an employee of the Government ... based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused."
At the time of this case, courts were struggling with the question of when duties
of government functionaries stop being discretionary and became subject to a
rule of due care. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (setting
forth the original analysis).
14 For representative commentary, see Kevin N. Courtois, "Standards and Prac-
tices". TheJudiciary 's Role in Promoting Safety in the Air Traffic Control System, 55J. AIR
L. & CoM. 1117, 1122-23 (1990) and Donald W. Madole & Philip Silverman, Spe-
cial Considerations in Air Traffic Control Cases, 312 PRACT. L. INST. LITIG. 119
(1986).
15 In actions against the United States under the FTCA, the court is the fact
finder. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988). (In this consolidated case, the jury decided
the case against the airline.).
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trates some of the problems with the application of specialized
rules to specialized fact patterns. In view of its results, Eastern Air
Lines should be recognized not just for the rule of government
responsibility for negligent harm caused by employees perform-
ing routine duties, but for illuminating problems inherent in
technical cases, particularly aviation cases.
The impact of the "technical problem" can be recognized in
the general problem of factual abstractionism in the cases. "Fac-
tual abstractionism" connotes the inevitable process by which
both the parties and the deciders of facts sift through facts per-
taining to the case to discover those facts that are of some legal
significance. 16 The abstractionism problem, if it exists, amounts
to leaving factual gaps that can steer case outcomes away from
results obtainable if all facts had received proper considera-
tion. 7 Abstractionism is all the more problematic where the
case involves complex facts and unfamiliar rules whose signifi-
cance may not be properly understood. Thus, while the court-
room situation inevitably entails some abstracting of facts, the
greater the factual intricacy, by hypothesis, the greater the dan-
ger of William James' "vicious abstractionism" interfering with a
correct verdict. Important facts may be ignored or possibly mis-
interpreted in light of a misunderstanding of the applicable law.
This might be the case in Eastern Air Lines. In the decisions of
the judge and jury, the errors of factual interpretation and legal
application are so conspicuous that it is almost inconceivable
that they could have occurred unless the experts employed by
the defendants, Eastern, and the government were either not in
attendance or were inadequately used.
16 This is a problem separate from distinguishing between adjudicative facts
(those facts relevant only to this case) and legislative facts (those relevant facts
about the world in general). Facts of either type can be improperly abstracted in
the presentation and deciding of cases.
17 William James termed the problem "vicious abstractionism," saying:
We conceive a concrete situation by singling out some salient or
important feature in it, and classing it under that; then, instead of
adding to its previous characters all the positive consequences
which the new way of conceiving it may bring, we proceed to use
our concept privatively; reducing the originally rich phenomenon
to the naked suggestions of that name abstractly taken, treating it as
a case of 'nothing but' that concept, and acting as if all the other
characters from out of which the concept is abstracted were ex-
punged. Abstraction, functioning in this way, becomes a means of
arrest far more than a means of advance in thought.
WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH 135-36 (1975).
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B. FINDINGS AND DECISIONS
The attentive reader might be surprised to learn that on the
facts outlined above, the Bolivian pilot was completely exoner-
ated by the jury, which found against the Eastern crew for pro-
ceeding to land without having received clearance.'" There was
testimony that the Eastern pilot had received clearance, which
the judge credited in his own ruling against the government. 9
The jury, nevertheless, found that the Eastern crew had caused
the accident despite the facts that (i) Eastern, as the aircraft
ahead and lower in the landing pattern, had by regulation and
custom the right of way; and (ii) the Eastern DC-4 was rammed
from behind and was thus helpless to avoid the peril. Yet, the
jury findings cannot be characterized as wholly irrational; the
appellate court found that the verdict against Eastern had been
tainted by some substantially prejudicial testimony at trial. The
court reversed and remanded on this point.2"
The trial judge also found against the government controller
for lack of adequate warnings to either plane,21 even though
there was uncontradicted testimony, which the judge did not re-
ject, indicating that there were many urgent warnings.22 The
judge also found against the government for the controller's
having cleared the two aircraft to land on the same runway at
the same time,23 despite the fact that the only testimony to that
effect was provided by the perjurious and mistaken P-38 pilot.
The P-38 pilot's "proof' on this point was his testimony that the
controller had advised him that he was "number two to land. '24
This was a standard traffic sequencing advisory which says nothing
about a clearance to land; nonetheless, this testimony persuaded
the judge. The only possible explanation for the judge's belief
is that either he was insufficiently instructed on this element or
he was not impressed with a very critical distinction. 25
18 Eastern Air Lines, 221 F.2d at 65-66.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 68-72. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed again and remanded.
Union Trust Co. v. Eastern Air Lines, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), modified per curiam, 350
U.S. 962 (1956) (remanding for the appeals court to consider items left unde-
cided by the Supreme Court's reversal).
21 Union Trust Co. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953).
22 Eastern Air Lines, 221 F.2d at 65-66.
23 Id. at 78. But the jury had a contrary finding that the Eastern pilot was not
cleared to land. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24 Eastern Air Lines, 221 F.2d at 66.
25 The distinction between an air traffic "advisory" and an air traffic "clear-
ance", can be a critical one, as it was in this case. FAA is at pains in its official
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Following the remand by the Supreme Court, the appellate
panel refused to disturb the trial court's ruling or the jury ver-
dict.2 6 On the issue of whether the Eastern aircraft had been
cleared to land, the jury found against Eastern (for negligently
attempting to land without a clearance), whereas the court
found against the government (for clearing both aircraft to land
simultaneously-upheld). As to these mutually contradictory
findings, the writer at the appellate court level (who, interest-
ingly, was also a dissenter) opined,
This court's affirmance of the judgments against the appellant
produces this anomalous situation: Eastern Air Lines and the
United States have both been mulcted in damages because of
contrary findings on a single fundamental factual issue. The
judgments against both defendants cannot possibly be correct;
justice has miscarried either as to Eastern or as to the Govern-
ment. Since the Supreme Court has affirmed the judgments
against the latter and so has stamped approval on the finding
that the Eastern plane was cleared to land, I see no escape from
the conclusion that Eastern Air Lines is the victim of injustice.27
The judge rightfully decried the patent injustice in the case.
One fact finder (the jury-finding against the totally fault-free
airline company) exonerated the sole negligent party, the Boliv-
ian pilot; the other fact finder (the judge) found against the
completely fault-free government FAA controller.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FuTuRE
Some new aviation rules arguably produced by this judicial
resolution include the following: (1) controller duty to main-
tain separation of aircraft is a strict liability duty for the govern-
ment regardless of any intervening pilot misconduct;28 (2) pilots
definitions of terms to make the distinction clear. See FAA ORDER 7110.65J
(1995), also known as the Air Traffic Controller's Manual, or ATCM, Pilot/Controller
Glossary. These definitions merely reflect a common sense distinction that is ap-
parent to anyone holding a pilot's license, i.e., that information concerning se-
quence in the traffic pattern is advisory only and is not to be confused with a
clearance to proceed for landing.
26 Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 239 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
27 Id. at 33 (footnote omitted) (Miller, J., dissenting).
28 Controller procedural duties are outlined in FAA ORDER 7110.65J (1995),
supra note 25. Among the primary duties of controllers is to maintain separation
of aircraft Id. para. 2-1-2. Furthermore, controllers are under a legal duty to
folloW procedures in their manuals. 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) (1995). See Rodriquez
v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 740 (3d Cir. 1987); Armstrong v. United States,
756 F.2d 1407, 1409 (9th Cir. 1985); see alsoJames L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation,
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operating in -terminal areas -under FAA tower control are effec-
tively relieved of their regulatory duty to maintain vigilance to
see and avoid other aircraft;29 (3) pilots are free to ignore con-
troller sequencing, traffic advisories, and even warnings in ter-
minal areas-in apparent disregard for either obvious or
inobvious collision dangers; (4) pilots are free to ignore the reg-
ulatory right-of-way of aircraft both ahead and lower on the final
approach segment, and (5) controllers have the presumptive
duty to compensate for any pilot misconduct by way of negli-
gence, lack of skill, or rule violations.
Fortunately for air travelers, none of these ascriptive rules are
given practical or legal effect today, nor will they ever be. The
skies would be far too dangerous. Thus, aside from its promi-
nence as the primary authority for non-applicability of the DFE
to government employees in the performance of routine duties,
Eastern Air Lines stands as an example of the worst effects of the
technical problem. The decisions in the case illustrate how the
ambiguity of technical facts in a case can distort the normal judi-
cial abstracting process into a charade. A question thus suggests
itself: How could Eastern Air Lines have been allowed to happen?
More to the point, why were the experts who were working for
the defendants, Eastern and the Government, unable to convey
to the fact finders how these facts had only one proper interpre-
tation and how the relevant aviation rules should have been ap-
plied to these facts? The answers must lie in lack of
persuasiveness on the part of the defendants' experts; at the very
least, they must have been less believable than the plaintiffs' ex-
perts.30 But, if the law were plain and the facts unequivocal, as
they seemed to be here, then only a modicum of persuasiveness
should have been necessary on the part of defendants' experts.
Liability of United States For Negligence of Air Traffic Controller, 46 A.L.R. FED. 24
(1980). However, imposition of strict liability on controllers is a novel approach.
29 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (1995) requires pilots to maintain vigilance to see and
avoid other aircraft. They must do this "[w]hen weather conditions permit, re-
gardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules
[IFR] or visual flight rules [VFR] ." Id. This particular language is important for
its imposition of the duty whenever there is adequate in-flight visibility. Con-
versely, when visibility conditions do not permit, pilots must obtain an instrument
clearance and submit to ATC radar control. Radar control is fairly ubiquitous,
but it is generally not mandatory unless operating in instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC) or in certain types of special airspace. See, e.g., FAA Order
7110.65J (ATCM), supra note 25.
30 The possibility of a deep pockets theory or just plain jury sympathy for plain-
tiffs is not excluded by this analysis. In the case of the judge, where these expla-
nations are less likely, any number of speculative reasons could be advanced.
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Perhaps Eastern Air Lines reflects a simple failure of lawyering.
After all, it is the job of counsel to successfully elicit the proper
expert testimony in order to win the case. This problem has
been the subject of trenchant comment.31 If not a lawyering
failure, the problem for these defendants might have been the
inability of lawyers and experts to speak each other's language.
Perhaps Eastern Air Lines should stand for the proposition that it
is essential for attorneys and experts to make the necessary intel-
lectual and tactical connections before making their united
presentation. From this supposition, one can hypothesize that
the more an attorney is familiar with the exigencies, norms, and
rules of a specialized field, the more effective her performance
will be, including her use of experts.32 Judge Harold Levanthal
observed that "[i] t is the kind of issue where a month of experi-
ence will be worth a year of hearings.P33
III. ADVERSARINESS: COSTS AND BENEFITS
At a rudimentary level, Eastern Air Lines can serve to illustrate
some of the general problems inherent in our adversarial pres-
s1 Samuel Gross stated:
At the low end of the spectrum, there are many cases in which the
lawyers are not competent enough, or do not care enough, or can-
not afford'to do anything more than cursorily prepare their ex-
perts. In these cases there is a fresh set of problems. Because
expert testimony is more difficult and complex than lay testimony,
minimal preparation is likely to produce incomprehensible evi-
dence, not to mention poor use of the available expertise.
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1148 (1991) (in view of
the futility and general disrepute of the current system, he argues for the adop-
tion a system of mandatory neutral experts); see also Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Ap-
pointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 480 (1988).
32 This is the view taken by Daniel C. Cathcart, who is a strong proponent of
the "expert" advocate in the aviation case. Cathcart's comments on the qualities
on the ideal aviation litigator may be well taken:
1. He should be a seasoned trial lawyer.
2. He should be an experienced pilot whose certificates and ratings
have at least qualified him for flight under instrument flight rules
and procedures. Piloting experience will provide the lawyer with
the necessary vocabulary, jargon and buzz words involved in avia-
tion. He will also be familiar with current procedures and tech-
niques and will have a practical knowledge of the Federal Aviation
Regulations and their application.
3. He should have had formal scientific training in physics, chemis-
try, higher mathematics, aerodynamics, (etc.]....
DANIEL C. CATHCART, AIRCRASH LITIGATION TECHNIQUES xi (1985).
33 American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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entation of complex facts and in particular, our use of experts.
As an initial matter, it is useful to consider why our system calls
for the use of experts. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the
system provides for experts when they possess specialized knowl-
edge, training, or experience that will assist the trier of fact.34
This standard merely begins the inquiry, however. We use ex-
perts, in general, not for their dispassionate, neutral examina-
tion of facts or their scientific conclusions, but to prevail.
A. ADVERSAmNESS AND ITS ALTERNATWVES
Accordingly, it has been said that the adversary system for
truthfinding is not necessarily the best system for all seasons.35
Examples abound in all places adhering to the Anglo-American
legal tradition where, in the interest of either efficiency, accu-
racy; or fairness, the general model of an inquisitory system is
adjudged. the model of choice. Two obvious examples are
most forms of administrative decisionmaking3 7 and official gov-
ernmental investigations and inquiries. The latter category in-
cludes impartial congressional investigations into matters of a
technical nature as well as executive and administrative inquiries
into catastrophes and accidents. Other areas subject to official
governmental inquiry include the conditions present in indus-
tries, the environment, foreign trade, and the monetary system.
34 FED. R. EVID. 702.
35 See Sward, supra note 5, at 301.
36 "Adversary" is understood as the traditional Anglo-American methodology
of deciding legal relations, i.e., the "combat" model. A central desideratum of
this system was expressed by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr. "Have the appel-
lants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional ques-
tions?" 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
"Inquisitorial" is understood as the system in use in most places in continental
Europe where a neutral magistrate is empowered to inquire into and decide facts
in a non-adversarial fashion. The chief focus of the inquisitorial system, accord-
ing to Sward, is truth-finding in ways that stress social and communitarian values
over individual and autonomy values. See Sward, supra note 5, at 313-15..
37 Based on the principles of efficiency and expertise, many matters that in this
country would at one time have been decided in an Article III court are 'now
being decided in administrative fora. The Supreme Court considers administra-
tive agencies experts in their own bailiwicks and has ruled that the judicial system
should not interfere absent irrationality, illegality, or clear abuse of discretion.
This stance has been denoted in the literature as "Chevron deference." See, e.g.,
WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 304-06 (2d ed. 1992),
citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) and its progeny.
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All such governmental fact-finding endeavors employ neutral
experts to find the data and to make it accessible to
decisionmakers.
Why, as a general rule in these situations, would fact finders
prefer a nonadversary method of fact gathering? One reason is
efficiency considerations. Where there is no legal dispute, and
thus no cause for implicating the judicial system and its meth-
ods, a nonadversarial method of data gathering is cost-effective.
Second, and more importantly, are considerations of accuracy
and reliability. In removing the ambiguities inherent in the ad-
versarial exposition of facts, a neutral, technical inquiry presents
the decision maker with a consistent interpretation rather than
a conundrum. Most scientific propositions, such as evolution
and laetrile, are capable of only one construction, and argu-
ments for any other construction would be wasted efforts in the
scientific community.38 Therefore, where the conclusions of ex-
perts, or groups of experts working in concert, are consistent
with good science, the fact finder is arguably better circum-
stanced to make a correct choice than when faced with intrinsic
ambiguity. For example, technical conclusions of groups of ex-
perts concerning either the monetary system or the causation of
accidents, though theoretically arguable, resemble scientific
conclusions. Such technical considerations are reached and
tested collegially by experts skilled in the art or science; thus,
they generally have a rightful claim to accuracy. Additionally,
these results are likely to be reliable because they tend to repli-
cate results in similar cases.
The neutral exposition of technical facts should be equally
competent in the legal setting.3 9 Evidence of this proposition
can be found in the strong push for neutral-found facts in help-
ing to resolve technical legal disputes.' This instinctive trust,
both on the part of courts and parties, of neutral, expert-found
facts is not difficult to understand: the facts are perceived as
38 See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 371.
39 This view is reflected in the Manual for Complex Litigation (3d ed. 1995))
when discussing appointment of experts, masters, and magistrates. See § 21.5 Spe-
cial Referrals.
. 40 One element of this evidence is the accelerating pace of court opinions
allowing greater portions of the reports of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) into evidence in transportation tort cases-despite the statutory
inadmissibility of the Board's conclusions. See 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1994). For a
complete statement of the law on inadmissibility of the Board's conclusions, see
LEE S. KREINDLER, 2 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw §§ 18.01-.03 (1995).
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generally accurate, reliable, and free of the taint of
partisanship. 41
The same rationale should apply with equal force to experts'
conclusions regarding factual relationships and matters of cau-
sation. In this connection, authorities have explained the statu-
tory inadmissibility of the conclusions of the NTSB
investigations as resulting from a desire to encourage full disclo-
sure in the interests of accident prevention 42 and to prevent in-
vasion into the province of the jury.43 Yet, the Supreme Court is
not necessarily persuaded by this logic. In Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, the Court took the opportunity to address the admissibil-
ity of the expert conclusions of a government report not having
any statutory protection (a report of a Navy aircraft accident).4
In finding that the entire Navy report was admissible, the Court
went to great lengths to stress the liberalizing trend in the cur-
rent Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court acknowledged and
was impressed by "the Federal Rules' general approach of re-
laxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony."4 5 There-
fore, the statutory inadmissibility of the NTSB conclusions could
be characterized as merely a creature of Congress that is argua-
bly at odds with its other indulgent pronouncements on admissi-
bility of evidence in general. It is also at odds with the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft Corp.
B. A MINI-THEORY ON BEHALF OF TECHNICAL NEUTRALITY
Other arguments support the use of neutral expert conclu-
sions in complex cases. Aside from the partisanship difficulty,
or rather springing from it, would be the manner in which fact
41 This is why, according to one commentator, the relevant statute proscribing
admission and the Board's supporting regulations have been all but eviscerated.
See Roy T. Atwood, Admissibility of National Transportation Safety Board Reports in
Civil Air Crash Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 469 (1987) (if the original justifica-
tion for exclusion was ever valid, it is no longer so); see also PhillipJ. Kolczynski,
The Criminal Liability of Aviators and Related Issues of Mixed Criminal-Civil Litigation:
'A Venture in the Twilight Zone,'51J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1985).
42 Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, 317 F.2d 628, 631-32 (3d Cir. 1963). Testimo-
nial immunities could alleviate this problem.
4s In reAir Crash at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1493, 1496 (D. Colo.
1989).
- 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988). The Court's touchstone for admission was the
"trustworthiness" criterion embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C) (the
public records and reports exception to the rule against hearsay).
45 Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 169. Congress plugged this gap in 1992 with
language essentially similar to the protections afforded NTSB opinions. PuB. L.
No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2507 (1992) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2254).
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finders may perceive the battle of the experts. It would be logi-
cal for lay fact finders to conclude that, if the experts cannot
agree on these matters, then objective reasonable scientific cer-
tainty in any complex case does not exist. From this perception,
the fact finder, as the final factual arbiter, may (and arguably is
forced to) turn to his own understandings of the physical world.
The ambiguity inherent in the presentation of diametrically
opposed opinions about technical facts, or in the application of
rules, can essentially be viewed as "liberating" the fact finder to
refer to his own frame of reference for deciding them. The
more esoteric the facts or the more unfamiliar the rules, by hy-
pothesis, the greater the tendency to fall back on one's own un-
derstandings. To the extent the fact finder's comprehension is
flawed or incomplete, then the potential of courtroom errors is
a consideration. Just as microphone feedback produces an
unintelligible squeal, the reliance by the fact finder on unin-
formed ideas or prejudices concerning facts to be found can
produce similar incoherence.
As a brief illustration of how this "feedback" error can oper-
ate, consider that many people hold eminently logical and prag-
matic, yet erroneous, notions of the physical world. Termed "lay
mental models" 46 these non-scientific and non-technical con-
structs enable people to infer (though sometimes incorrectly)
facts and relationships about nature and technology in an ad
hoc fashion-without doing much harm. For example, edu-
cated people functioned perfectly well in the mistaken belief
that the earth was flat-they did so for centuries, even after sci-
entific evidence was available to refute the erroneous theory.
There are modern analogs for this relatively harmless, yet er-
roneous, form of pragmatic problem-solving.4 7 A simple illustra-
tion is provided by the notion held by many that a
thermostatically-controlled automatic heating or cooling device
will reach a target temperature more quickly by setting the ther-
46 There is extensive literature on this phenomenon. See Brian Wynne, Public
Understanding of Science, in HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 361,
370-73 (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds., 1995).
47 The work ofJon D. Miller and others has shown that most Americans-93%
to be exact-continue to be scientifically illiterate, under fairly relaxed standards.
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENTIFIC LITERACY, IN-
TERNET WEBSITE, http://www.icasLorg/www/icaslab.html, 11/10/95. The findings of
the American researchers' have been duplicated in Britain. SeeJohn R. Durant et
al., The Public Understanding of Science, NATURE, Jul. 6, 1989, at 11.
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mostat beyond the target temperature.48 It is plausible that
mechanisms could be designed to work this way, even though
they are not.
In the hypothetical courtroom situation where adverse ex-
perts contend for different understandings of how thermostats
work, feedback error could easily favor an incorrect "expert" in-
terpretation.49  The expert who can plausibly confirm the
factfinder's pragmatic predisposition with respect to the facts
will be the expert finding credence. Of course, it may be argued
that the inquisitorial style of truth finding is not any more im-
mune from this type of error than is adversary fact finding.
Working strongly against this argument, however, is the fact that
the independent neutral expert will be much less likely to
render an opinion when payment is dependent on the opinion
being the "right one."50 In fact, serious doubts have been ex-
pressed whether adversariness of expert information is a neces-
sary concomitant of our system.51
48 This illustration comes from a widely reported public survey conducted in
this country in the last decade. Wynne, supra note 46, at 371-72. Of course, many
physical properties of the world are correctly understood by people, but these
would not likely be the areas of inquiry necessitating expert assistance. (The
standard for Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is that the expert be able to "assist" the
trier of fact.).
49 If not clearly erroneous, these facts are not likely to be corrected on appeal.
Similarly, in an apocryphal New Jersey case in the early 1990s, two lawyers were
heard to argue in court whether 12:00 p.m. meant noon or midnight, an appar-
ently material distinction to the case. It was reported that the judge could not
decide that day which was right. (The courtroom exchange was a news item and
not to my knowledge reported in any case reporter.).
50 To say the that theoretical range of opinion on an esoteric subject is wide is
not necessarily to impute dishonesty. For example, a court once said, "In the
great majority of the cases the experts are entirely honest, and their disagree-
ment is simply a typical illustration of reasonable minds differing in their opin-
ions." McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511 n.19 (NJ. Super. 1979) (citing
Harold F. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 1, 75-76 (1949)). Yet the burgeoning industry of expert courtroom practice
has, in the view of some, engendered the need for curbing inexpert experts by
removing courtroom immunity and allowing suits for expert malpractice. See
Carol H. Garcia, Expert Witness Malpractice: A Solution to the Problem of the Negligent
Expert Witness, 12 Miss. C. L. REv. 39 (1991); see also DonJ. DeBenedictis, Off-target
Opinions, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 76.
51 The literature is replete with such expressed doubts, starting as far back as
1848 (and perhaps much farther), with publication of Judge John P. Taylor's
Treatise of the Law of Evidence (3d ed. 1858) (as cited in Gross, supra note 31, at
1114). Taylor sought to isolate several types of evidence givers whose testimony
should be treated with caution, saying that "(p] erhaps the testimony which least
deserves credit with ajury is that of skilled witnesses.... [I] t is often quite surpris-
ing to see with what facility, and to what extent, their views can be made to corre-
592
AVIATION TORTS
The "battle of the experts" also contributes to a related prob-
lematic factor which confounds reliable truthfinding in complex
cases. This problem springs from the persuasiveness of counsel
and her expert. This refers not to the inherent truth or right-
ness of their presentations but to the quality of their argumenta-
tion. This factor can be termed "non-germane persuasiveness."
I suggest only that a good lawyer and her expert can win on bad
facts. The strength of this factor no doubt also varies in direct
proportion to the general inaccessibility of the facts to
laypersons.
This hypothesis is probably all the more apt where the fact
finder is generally uninformed or may be predisposed to a "flat-
earth" view of some facts. It is presumably also all the more per-
tinent where the fact finder must apply technical rules without
adequate exposition of their policies. For these reasons, any
controversy with adversary exposition of technical facts or rule
applications is probably well-founded.
The next section details some of the special problems in avia-
tion, perhaps making the field more susceptible than others to
the vagaries of the technical problem. It reviews some of the
commentary reflecting dissatisfaction with the current system
and discusses possible solutions.
IV. REAL PROBLEMS, PROBLEMATIC SOLUTIONS
Deciding complex facts in a tort action can be an unremark-
able task. Even the intrinsic problem of factual ambiguity is not
entirely insoluble where the facts are susceptible to some com-
mon sense confirmations. There are probably many fields,
though complex and technical, where the issue of due care in a
given instance is capable of lay resolution. One of the reasons
for this is because in these fields, such as surgery or fire fighting,
deciding the matter of due care might be founded more on rea-
son rather than on understanding and applying esoteric rules.
The technical problem begins to assume larger proportions and
probably produces more error where the field is subject to regu-
lation by rules with policies that are unknown or not fully under-
stood. For example, where the common sense purport of a rule
is belied by a subtle policy objective or by the requirement to
spond with the wishes and interests of the parties who call them." Id. (quoting
TAYLOR, supra, §§ 45-50, at 65-69). Gross argues that adversariness of experts is
counterproductive to effective truthfinding and not necessary to our system.
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balance values implicated by the particular factual situation, the
rule is even more subject to inexpert application.
A. DISTINGUISHING FEATUREs OF AVIATION TORTS
The foregoing may distinguish aviation torts. The existence
and pervasive influence of federal regulations governing every
aspect of the enterprise operates to suffuse many legal disputes
with a technical rule application problem.52 The rules are not
necessarily those of everyday experience, and as a result they are
not necessarily subject to easy resolution by reference to lay un-
derstandings. But parties to a case do not always completely ad-
dress policies or explain how certain values are affected by a
particular application. For example, a pilot of an aircraft that is
in extremis may be called upon to balance the values of obser-
vance of regulatory right-of-way and self preservation. A party
injured as a result may call upon the fact finder to find that a
certain rule is applicable irrespective of the circumstances. The
real question may be how the rule is best applied to serve the
most important value at the moment. The problem is that the
present system incorporates few features that help the fact
finder properly discriminate between the two versions of techni-
cal truth being offered.
Many, if not most, aviation rules may appear to the uniniti-
ated as categorical imperatives. This would encourage a lay fact
finder to ignore policies and eschew balancing. As official gov-
ernment pronouncements, the rules give strong impetus for res-
olution of legal disputes by per se attributions of either due care
or negligence. Indeed, the common law of many states will im-
pose that type of analysis. Thus, even though the authorities will
state that liability for aviation accidents is decided upon ordi-
nary due care concepts, 5 the decision-maker is still burdened by
deciding the substantive nature of the rule of due care applied
to the specific set of facts. Is it ordinary care, or is it the man-
52 The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) make up probably the most com-
prehensive set of rules of conduct with the force of law to govern any human
endeavor. All of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations is "Aeronautics."
The FARs, comprising Chapters 1 & 2 of Title 14, govern: every aspect of aviation
including flight rules and the operation of aircraft; airplane certification and
maintenance; air traffic control; and operation of airlines, flying schools, char-
ters, airports and navigation aids. See 14 C.F.R., chs. 1 & 2 (1995). The FARs also
have the force of law. See In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (lst Cir. 1982);
United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1960).
53 8 AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 79 (1965).
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date of a federal regulation? If it is the latter, have the regula-
tion's policies been completely explained and interpreted to the
fact finder?
Consider the pilot's regulatory duty to "maintain vigilance to
see and avoid" other traffic. 54 A main issue in a midair collision
case concerns applicability of this regulation. One side may ar-
gue for a finding that it was breached as a matter of law, and
that this breach amounts to negligence per se. A counterargu-
ment will center around whether the pilot had a true opportu-
nity to see and avoid. Additionally, a counterargument will raise
circumstantial matters such as the following: (1) sun angle,
speed, size, and relative approach angles of the aircraft, atmos-
pheric conditions; (2) whether one or both aircraft were under
air traffic control; (3) and whether the-control met a due care
standard. Arguably, imposition of liability based solely on the
facial implication of the regulation could set a standard exceeding
due care under certain circumstances. Would such a standard
be correct?5 By the same token, mere regulatory compliance
should not supply a conclusion of due care under the specific
circumstances. A simple illustration is provided by a crash
caused by the neglect of a pragmatic (i.e., aircraft control or
navigation) duty as opposed to neglect of a regulatory duty.
Here, compliance with all regulations should not defeat a claim
of compensable negligence.
These illustrations point out that the main legal issue in an
accident case should be causation rather than breach. Yet, an
alleged breach commonly becomes the main issue. This is not
to say that the breach of a rule cannot sometimes amount to
causation, but this would be subject to proofs based on the con-
clusions of experts. Thus, ideally, the experts' function will be
to provide conclusions that will help the fact finder to decide
whether at the time of breach the risk of an accident was reason-
ably foreseeable.56 If harm was not reasonably foreseeable at the
time of a party's breach, then an analysis informed by neutral
54 See 14 C.F.R. § 91-113(b) (1995).
55 This question was presumably answered in the negative by the court in
Steering Committee v. United States, 6 F.3d 572, 576-79 (9th Cir. 1993). The
court declined to find that the pilot's duty of vigilance, while important, ex-
ceeded ordinary due care. Id. at 579; see also Donald R. Andersen, Recent Cases
and Developments in Aviation Law, 60J. AR L. & COM. 3, 110-11 (1994).56 This is the law's formula for deciding proximate cause. When combined
with factual, or "substantial factor" cause, foreseeable results will produce legal
liability. See infra note 94 for authorities.
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expertise would not connect this breach with the harm. This is
as true of the breach of regulations as it is of breach of the rules
of due care. Causation is always a separate analysis, and it should
be the dispositive analysis in an accident case.
Therefore, the prime function of experts in an accident case
is to help the fact finder determine when and if harm of the
type occasioned was reasonably foreseeable. For this reason, avi-
ation accident cases absolutely require expert assistance since
laypersons have little, if any, basis for making such decisions un-
aided. Yet, in the adversary modus of their employment, experts
are forced by the system to "throw off' some of their authority in
elucidating the causative facts. This authority is devolved upon
the fact finders by the default of ambiguity. In acknowledging
this problem, the commentators have offered some solutions.
B. SOLUTIONS OF THE COMMENTATORS
In 1993, a team of commentators recounted the long history
of individual efforts to implement a judicial system of neutral
expertise that preceded the adoption of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706 (permitting court-appointed experts).57 The authors
adverted to the groundbreaking attempts to set up a system for
use of impartial experts in medical malpractice cases by the Bar
of New York City in 1956 and to several court opinions either
using or extolling neutral experts or panels of experts.58 The
authors quoted a judge who found the advice of an indepen-
dently appointed expert invaluable on a summary judgment mo-
tion invaluable:
A busy trial court faced with complex technology may require
independent education or analysis if it is to understand the tech-
nology before the trial. The parties nominated [the expert] and
agreed that he is an independent expert. If a motion for sum-
mary judgment appears to have merit a court will need some ed-
ucation about the technology at an earlier stage of the
proceedings but it will not need independent findings. That is
this case. What was sought here was an independent explanation
of the technology and assistance in understanding the positions
of the parties' experts.59
57 William G. Burd & Madelyn S. Lozano, Experts: Is the End Near for Their Use?,
59J. AIR. L. & COM. 77, 78-82 (1993) (citing Learned Hand, Historical and Practi-
cal Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1902)).
58 Id. at 105-06.
59 Id. at 109 (quoting Hemstreet v. Burroughs Corp., No. 81-C6412, 1987 WL
13994 (N.D. Il. July 10, 1987)).
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In addition to being an obvious aid in expeditiously disposing
of cases by summary judgment, the authors point out that the
mere presence of a court expert discourages frivolous lawsuits
and avoids discovery harassment of the partisan experts. 60 They
are not sanguine, however, about the prospects for near-term
structural change. Citing a recent poll of judges conducted by
the Federal Judicial Center, the authors highlight substantial in-
stitutional resistance to active use of the court's authority to ap-
point experts sua sponte (conferred in Federal Rule of Evidence
706)."6 One discovery was that judges generally prefer the par-
ties to control the evidence, if for no other reason than its con-
tribution to the preservation of true adversariness in the case.62
The authors decried this mind-set as exaltation of form over
function.63
Some commentary has addressed the problems of mass torts,
specifically in the aviation context. For example, Kyle Brackin
wrote approvingly of draft legislation that was submitted. to the
American Bar Association for consideration in 1989.64 The leg-
islation sought to build upon the concept of the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation by creating a federal judicial panel on
mass torts. The draft bill, which the ABA rejected in 1990, also
included provisions for court appointed neutral experts in more
complex cases. 65 The provisions, according to Brackin, con-
ferred several benefits:'
60 Id. at 108.
61 Id. at 110-11 (citing Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Defining a Role for
Court-Appointed Experts, FJC DIRECTIONS, Aug. 1992). The authorities generally
approve of this feature of the federal rules. SeeJoe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willg-
ing, Court-Appointed Eperts, reprinted in JoE S. CECIL ET AL., REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFC EVIDENCE 525, 571 (1994);JAMES L. STENGEL & ANDREW M. CAIAMARI,
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 5.6, at 5-23 (1994); Theodore I. Botter, The Court-Ap-
pointed Impartial Expert, reprinted in MELVIN D. KRAFT USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES
53, 84-85 (2d ed. 1982).
62 Burd & Lozano, supra note 57, at 111.
63 Id.
64 Kyle Brackin, Salvaging the Wreckage: Multidistrict Litigation and Aviation, 57J.
AIR L. & CoM. 655, 698-99 (1992). These ideas are not to be confused with the
urgings of Professors Arthur Kantrowitz, Allan Mazur, and others in the 1960s
and 1970s for the creation of a "science court." The science court idea sought
definitive resolution of major public policy scientific issues, such as nuclear
power, pollution, and substance toxicity by science-trainedjudges. For a compar-
ison, see Twenty-Five Year Retrospective on the Science Court: A Symposium, 4 RISK:
ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 2 (1993).
65 Brackin, supra note 64, at 98-99.
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The overburdened court will have expert assistance in making
sense of very technical issues. A disinterested party can objec-
tively evaluate the facts and testimony of the many concerned
parties much as a special master could. Since the plaintiff and
defendant each retain experts to help attorneys sift through their
cases, it seems only fair that a judge faced with hundreds of cases
should have the ability to retain experts of his own.66
In recognition of the specialized nature of aviation torts, Brac-
kin also suggested that aviation cases could be regularized na-
tionwide by conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction over them,
much the same as in admiralty.67 He even suggested creating an
arm of the FAA or the NTSB that would be empowered to de-
cide fault in aviation cases.68
Andrew J. Dilk made remarkably similar suggestions in 1987.
An FAA supervising attorney, Dilk took note of what he per-
ceived to be a systematic tendency of federal judges to find
against the government in cases involving the interaction of a
pilot and an FAA air traffic controller.69 (These may conve-
niently be referred to as the "pilot-controller nexus" cases.) In
these cases, pilots, injured parties, or their representatives allege
government employee negligence in causing an accident. Dilk
referred to what he perceived as the federal judiciary's un-
declared bias against the government in the pilot-controller
nexus cases.7" As a corrective, he urged the creation of an "Avia-
tion Tort Liability Board," managed under the auspices of the
FAA, which would decide aviation tort claims against the govern-
ment.7 1 The gist of his suggestion was that, regardless of the
reasons for the perceived systematic unfairness in the aviation
cases (particularly against the government), it would cease being
a problem under a regime of informed decisionmaking through
66 Id. at 700 (footnote omitted).
67 Brackin noted that he was not the first to suggest this idea. Id. at 702. Sev-
eral bills had been submitted to Congress in the 1960s by Senator Tydings of
Maryland with this goal in mind. Id.
68 Id. at 711. Brackin likened this professional fault assessment board to work-
men's compensation panels or the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 711
n.280. Both find fault, and/or make damage awards, and make decisions that
fully bind the parties. Id.
69 Andrew J. Dilk, Aviation Tort Litigation Against The United States-Judicial In-
roads on the Pilot-in-Command Concept, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 797 (1987). Dilk was at
the time Manager of the Accident Counsel Branch, Litigation Division, Office of
the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration. Id. at 867.
70 Id. at 799-800.
71 Id. at 865.
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neutral expertise.72 He argued that such a Board could be ade-
quately screened off from agency influence.73 Dilk also argued
that such a Board would eliminate the problem of relying on of
"federal district court judge [s], [who], burdened with constitu-
tional issues and prioritized criminal cases, cannot be expected
to absorb the technical complexities of pilot and air traffic con-
trol procedures in a relatively short period of time and dispas-
sionately render a truly objective judgment."74
Nor was Dilk sanguine about the possibility of any lesser meas-
ures being able to effectively address the problem. He also
noted the limited effectiveness of magistrates arbitrating avia-
tion claims due'to their "inability to comprehend the complexi-
ties of the aviation system and tort law in the time restrictions
imposed upon them."75 While there is really no political constit-
uency, and thus little, if any, chance for any meaningful struc-
tural modification, Dilk nonetheless made an impassioned case
for his thesis that there is something wrong in the aviation
cases-at least where the government is concerned.
Other commentary has pointed to the ready availability of ex-
pertise that could help guide case outcomes. For example, in
the pilot-controller nexus cases, Kevin Courtois opined that be-
cause the FAA is composed of experts, its conception of safety
procedures is probably more informed than any judicial pro-
nouncements on the cases. 76 In regard to the pilot-controller
nexus cases in particular, Courtois noted that "[a] ir traffic con-
trol is a technical and complicated undertaking. The FAA has
the specialized resources and experience necessary to evaluate
alternative safety measures .... The judiciary lacks comparable
technical resources and does not have consistent contact with
72 Id. at 864-66.
73 Id. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a model for the insu-
lation of agency adjudicators (initially examiners, today administrative law
judges). 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1994). The Act contains other structural protections
to maintain the independence ofjudges. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, When the Cur-
tain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 759 (1981); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regula-
tions: The Case for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 389
(1991). •
74 Dilk, supra note 69, at 865.
75 Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
76 Courtois, supra note 14, at 1148. In an important insight, Courtois noted
that as long as courts continue to apply a per se standard of negligence to con-
trollers, -the FAA has little incentive to rationalize its rules and make them more
responsive to the total needs of the air traffic system. Id. at 1154.
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aviation issues."" Courtois' thesis was that a fact-specific ap-
proach to aviation liability, as opposed to a per se approach,
leads to more accurate results as well as serves the goal of en-
couraging the FAA to promulgate more specific instructions and
standards.
Although the focus of commentators varies somewhat accord-
ing to the particular twist of the argument or problem area iden-
tified, the commentators have been nearly uniform in the views
that (1) aviation is a particularly complex and vexing subset of
the technical problem; (2) the current adversarial factfinding
system is not doing an adequate job of assuring accuracy or reli-
ability in the deciding of cases; and (3) the current system is
producing injustice. The next section discusses an attempt to
empirically test aviation tort actions in order to assess the claims
of the commentators. It also provides an argument and ration-
ale for the appropriateness of NTSB conclusions as a research
standard.78 It then reports the results of the inquiry, using an
aggregate analysis.
V. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF AVIATION TORT ACTIONS
If the commentators are wrong in their*assertions, we would
expect aviation tort case outcomes to conform closely to the
conclusions of an independent neutral standard, assuming the
standard meets the criterion of trustworthiness. Reports of the
NTSB have many hallmarks of trustworthiness. They are the
products of experts operating in a collegial investigative envi-
ronment. These experts are employed full-time as professional
technical investigators. And finally, their reports are free of the.
77 Id. at 1150.
78 This is not the first attempt to evaluate case outcomes by an independent
standard. The first true empirical study comparing judicial outcomes with an
independent standard was the early 1960s University of Chicago Law School
study performed by Professor Harry Kalven and- others. Using a detailed ques-
tionnaire of 600judges (Kalven's expert or standard) supervising some 8000jury
trials, researchers made major findings in both criminal and civil cases. For ex-
ample, they were able to cast doubt on much of the common lore ofjury incom-
petence and bias. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L. Rrv.
1055 (1964); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage
Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958). For more recent empirical work of this type,
see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26
GA. L. REv. 85 (1991); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4.
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error-inducing ambiguity inherent in partisanship.79 Factual
and theoretical bases for these themes are developed in Part A.
Part B explains the assumptions and methodology of the in-
stant study. Briefly, the method chosen for the comparison
study was to inquire if the main issue in a tort action, whether
the defendant's conduct or its product-or alternatively, the
plaintiff's contribution to the harm-was confirmed by the
NTSB in its report on accident causation. 0 An instance of vari-
ance is regestered when there is a lack of substantial concor-
dance on this issue.81 In Part C, each "variance" case is reviewed
independently. Part D aggregates the data, develops statistics,
and discusses possible implications.
A. THE STANDARD: NTSB REPORTS
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) exists as
an independent, federal fact-finding agency for all major mis-
haps in the transportation industry. The Board's responsibilities
include the investigation of mishaps involving aviation, highway,
railroad, maritime, pipeline, and hazardous materials, fixing the
causes thereof, and making safety recommendations.82
79 Aviation litigators can point to cases where the NTSB investigation arguably
fell short of the mark. However, this criticism does not blunt the statistical
probability of a generally accurate institutional product. Furthermore, accident
investigations always remain open and are subject to revision based on the receipt
of new information. John S. Hoff & Thomas A. Smith, NTSB Probable Cause in
Error? Change It!, 1992 INT'L SOC'Y OF AIR SAFETY INVESTIGATORS (ISASI) F. PRO.
281.
80 The NTSB computer brief reports, called "Briefs of Accidents," consist of a
one or two page computer printout of the essential accident facts. Included is a
200 word narrative description plus separate findings of causes or "factors."
These findings are usually undifferentiated as to primacy; thus, they are readily
analogized to concurring causes in the law, i.e., causes involving no supersession,
one by the other. The Brief reports are available to the public. (For major acci-
dents the NTSB publishes its extensive "Blue Cover" report, which includes a
detailed and far reaching analysis of all aspects of the accident. See 49 C.F.R.
§ 845.40 (1995)).
81 "Variance" as used here refers to mere difference, not to variance as the
term is understood and used in parametric statistics.
82 The first federal agency specifically charged with aviation mishap investiga-
tion was the Air Safety Board, created in 1938. Its duties were absorbed into the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) via the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and then
later into the newly created NTSB, as an arm of the Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT), via the DOT Act of 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 935. The
NTSB achieved independent status via the Independent Safety Board Act of
1974. See Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2166, as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-74, 95
Stat. 1065, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1901 (1988).
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Composed of a staff of transportation safety and accident inves-
tigation professionals, and headed by a five-member independ-
ent Board, the NTSB is a paradigm of the independent, expert
investigative agency. Indeed, for many years the Board's reports
of accidents have been instrumental in influencing the out-
comes of aviation tort cases (and settlement negotiations).83 Of
course, the courtroom inadmissibility of the Board's "conclu-
sions," " or judgments on the specific issue of accident causa-
tion, has operated to limit the Board's effectiveness in
enhancing overall transportation safety.
Although the Board's products have been subject to various
criticisms by lawyers over the years,85 no report has been made
regarding systematic bias or general lack of accuracy in the
Board's conclusions. One factor that may account for this is the
professional qualifications of the investigative and analytical
For a history, see C.O. Miller, Down with Probable Cause, 1991 INT'L Soc'Y OF AIR
SAFETY INVESTIGATORS [ISASI] F. PRO. 121 [hereinafter Miller I] and C.O. Miller,
Aviation Accident Investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives, 46 J.'AIR L. & COM.
237 (1981) [hereinafter Miller II]. Mr. Miller was a former head of the Bureau,
now Office, of Aviation Safety, the NTSB arm responsible for aviation accident
investigations.
83 In view of the fact that "[m]ost reports are accurate, well documented, and
incisive," Stuart M. Speiser saw the reports as a "lever" in settlement negotiations.
13 Am. JUR. TRIALS § 62, at 670 (reprinted in STUART M. SPEISER, AVIATION Acci-
DENT LrrIGATION (1968)). Windle Turley, referring to the existence of the NTSB
reports, commented that it is "economical to build on the work that has already
been done .... WINDLE TuRLE, AVIATION LrIGATION § 8.12, at 303 (1986). Lee
Kreindler complimented the Board's (then the Civil Aeronautics Board's) em-
ployees as "the most devoted public servants I have ever met. [The Board] has
access to and freely draws upon the best brains in the aviation industry...
KREINDLER, supra note 40, § 23.01, at 23.
84 See KREINDLER, supra note 40 and accompanying text. For current commen-
tary, see M.P. Papadalds, The Aftermath of Disaster A Primer on Government and Legal
Investigations of Aviation Crashes, LAW.-PILOTS B. Assoc'N J., Winter 1995, at 29.
85 One complaint has concerned the Board's rule (codified at 49 C.F.R.
§ 831.11 (1995)) allowing "party" status to those whose conduct or product may
have contributed to the accident. ("Parties" may include manufacturers, airline
companies, and union representatives). According to some, withholding party
status from potential civil claimants unfairly prejudices them. See Miller II, supra
note 82, at 290. See also TURLEY, supra note 83, at 284. As pointed out by one
court, however, the inherent adversariness injected into the proceedings by the
presence of a potential claimant even as a "silent note taker[ ]" would chill the
"neutral, calm and scientific atmosphere" essential for an investigation. Thomas
Brooks Chartered v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 646 (10th Cir. 1990.) This sounds
like endorsement of the notion, argued herein, of the general superiority of the
inquisitory style for technical fact finding.
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staff.86 Although the five appointed Board members are not
necessarily chosen for technical qualifications, a common back-
ground thread is professional stature in the aviation, business,
science, or legal fields.87 Besides institutional expertise, an in-
vestigative team is preferable since, as a general proposition, the
larger the group, the greater the likelihood of superior fact re-
call and the correction of errors.88. When the fact finders are all
experts operating in a collegial, scientific atmosphere, there is
good reason, ceteris paribus, to suspect a fairly accurate report.
Yet an argument against the accuracy and consistency of
NTSB reports could conceivably rest on the fact that the Board
devotes a relatively small quantum amount of resources to mi-
nor crashes. The degree of institutional effort devoted to a par-
ticular investigation, including the amount of expertise brought
to bear, depends on the magnitude of the crash and the
number of fatalities. The Board husbands its resources by mar-
shalling investigative talent according to these criteria so that a
general aviation accident with one fatality may have only one
NTSB field investigator assigned.8 9 Even though there might be
reason to suspect the quality of such a report, such skepticism is
misplaced. First, in a field investigation, the investigator is usu-
ally assisted by experts from local FAA offices who help the in-
vestigator analyze items such as weather services, air traffic
control, and flight planning.90 Second, the investigator's report
consists strictly of facts found, not conclusions; this "factual re-
port" is the only product courts have declared admissible. 91 The
investigator then recommends that the Board adopt the conclu-
86 The position descriptions for the 11 sub-types of air crash accident investiga-
tor (e.g., Air Carrier, Structures, Powerplant, Human Performance, etc.) require
applicants with strong aviation or accident investigation credentials, or both. See
NTSB, Position Vacancy Announcement, No. 90-096 Senior Air Safety Investigator
Sept. 14, 1990 (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce). Furthermore,
successful applicants receive additional training by the Board at its Washington
headquarters.
87 For example, in 1994, two or three of the members had legal training. Tel-
ephone inquiry with the NTSB's Public Inquiries Office (Aug. 1994).
88 This is a finding ofJohn Guinther in his generally favorable report on juries.
SeeJOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988). Guinther relies on the rule of
numerosity to bolster the jury's standing (echoing the conclusions of Kalven,
supra note 78).
89 Papadakis, supra note 84, at 30. "General aviation" refers to most private or
pleasure flying, but includes charters and the like. General aviation accidents
without fatalities are delegated to the FAA. See 49 C.F.R pt. 800, app. (1995).
90 Papadakis, supra note 84, at 31.
91 See Atwood, supra note 41, at 489-90.
19961 603
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sions of causation resulting from the investigation. These rec-
ommendations are sent to the Board under separate cover and
are analyzed by the Washington staff.92 The staff may approve
or modify the investigator's conclusions. To support overall
quality control, some reports are also forwarded to the Board
for review. Therefore, even though the resources devoted to a
general aviation accident with one fatality are fewer than those
assigned to a major air crash disaster, the Board has procedures
in place to insure consistency.
B. STUDY DESIGN
A necessary consideration for the present undertaking was
whether systematic conceptual differences could be shown to ex-
ist between the ways accident investigators figure the notion of
causation and the way lawyers view it. If there were any such
conceptual discontinuities, there would be problems with this
research. Fortunately, even though there are some semantic dis-
similarities, analysis discloses no fundamental discord between
the approach of science or law to the discovery or description of
"causation.""3 Thus, the safety professionals' usage of "probable
cause" signifies that probabilistic estimates can substitute for cer-
tainty. This locution does not disagree with any notions of cau-
sation used in legal application. Similarly, the lawyer's use of
"proximate," or legal, cause means that the proximity, or alter-
natively, the "directness," of the link between an ostensible
cause and a result is so close that, in logic, they must be
connected.94
92 For details of the investigative and reporting process. See NTSB Order 70,
Major Accident/Incident Investigation and Report Preparation, Mar. 16, 1988
(formerly NTSB ORDER 6200.4 and 6200.1) (on file with the Journal of Air Law &
Commerce).
93 At least one commentator has argued vigorously against the idea of compar-
ing "technical" findings of investigators and "legal" causation findings, saying that
they have different conceptual foundations. See Miller I and Miller II, supra note
82. But Miller's arguments against comparability appear to rest largely on seman-
tical grounds.
94 "Legal cause" is the concurrence of (i) "substantial factor" cause and (ii)
lack of a liability-limiting rule for how the particular breach contributed to the
happenstance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 431 (1964) [her-.
einater RESTATEMENT]. "Substantial factor" cause is the Restatements variation on
what is more commonly referred to in the legal community as the factual, or sine
qua non, cause.
Absence of a liability-liniting rule is the Restatement's method of assigning legal
responsibility and is capable of being analogized to the more common usage,
"proximate cause." The concept of "proximate cause" limits the scope of legal
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The safety community's emphasis on acknowledging uncer-
tainty and the legal community's emphasis in satisfying logic can
be seen as compatible goals. These related aspirations are
united by the quest for objective truth in the discovery of how
facts are connected. They also are supported by certain shared
approaches in problem-solving: these would have to include
common sense, systematic analysis, and a due regard for evi-
dence. 95 In short, thoughtful people proceeding from sound
premises and an insightful view of the facts should reach similar
conclusions regarding their true provenance. If this is an accu-
rate reflection on the processes of law and science, then differ-
ent usages should not mask the fundamental congruence of
expectable results.
The design of this study also required consideration of
whether the differing goals of the two enterprises-safety im-
provements in the one and victim compensation in the other-
might act to skew or invalidate the results of a comparison ef-
fort. To rebut this suggestion, it would seem that if the ex-
pected results of inquiry will be similar, the uses to which they
are put should not matter. Second, if, as indicated above, the
immediate goal of the two enterprises is objective truthfinding,
the existence of differing ultimate goals should also be immate-
rial. Finally, in answering the suggestion that differing ultimate
aspirations may invalidate comparisons, there is evidence of one
shared ultimate goal, and that is the enhancement of prospec-
tive societal safety by molding future conduct.96 Thus, if differ-
liability to harms eventuating from "foreseeable risks" or from "directly traceable"
forces. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 41, 42 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON).
95 Commentators who have thought about the issue of comparability of scien-
tific and legal analyses are in general agreement. One commentator explained,
"[t]o the extent that there is 'a method' of reasoning in the law, it is the same as
that in science-it is the rational method." Michael Scriven, Methods of Reasoning
and Justification in Social Science and Law, 23J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 198 (1970) (em-
phasis in original). His interlocutor wrote that even if the methods of the two
fields varied as to the gathering of data, "[a]fter the findings are in, the interpre-
tation process involves both professions in similar endeavors-inferring, reason-
ing, analyzing, etc. In a word, thinking." Maurice Rosenberg, "Comments" on
Michael Scriven's Methods of Reasoning and Justification in Social Science and Law," 23
J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 204 (1970).
96 That improvement in safety is the ultimate goal of NTSB investigation and
reporting is beyond cavil. The commentators also agree that this is an important
goal of the tort system. Courtois, in his survey of authorities including Prosser,
Keeton, Calabresi, Posner, and Englard, concluded that with the possible excep-
tion of England, there is agreement that regulation of safety is at the core of tort
law. Courtois, supra note 14, at 1195 n.194.
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ing goals were to make a difference, the fundamental
congeniality of these ultimate aims provides adequate support
for the notion of the basic comparability of the methods, and
particularly for the expected results of inquiry.
As a final experimental check on the comparability of the re-
sults of NTSB investigation and tort case decisions, an examina-
tion of each of the thirty-four NTSB investigations appearing in
the sample was conducted for conformance to a result produci-
ble by a legal causation analysis, which is informed by neutral
expertise. 97 The result of this effort was a finding of broad
agreement throughout the thirty-four case sample between in-
dependent analysis and the NTSB result. This outcome should
signify that whatever concepts, methodologies, or nomenclature'
are used by professional safety investigators, their final product
can be said, in many cases, to resemble a result wrought by stan-
dard legal causation analysis. Thus, by both theory and experi-
ment, arguments for the basic validity of the study design are
supportable.
Yet, a possible confounding factor in the analysis could be the
intermittent practice of accident investigators to apply the event-
condition school of accident causation. The event-condition
school reflects a commonly held view in the safety community
that an accident sequence is best described as a chain of causal
events leading to a final disaster.98 Thus, investigators will often
point to a precipitating event or condition, such as "engine fail-
ure" or "airframe icing" as a triggering cause. The law, however,
requires that some relevant human conduct be identified.99 A
meaningful comparison with a court result is still possible in
such a case. To transform the investigator's finding into a con-
97 Authorities and methodology are set forth supra note 95.
98 Inherent in this approach is an emphasis on accurately identifying events in
the chain-without necessarily honing in on relevant conduct. See, e.g., Richard
H. Wood, The Determination of Aircraft Accident Causes, 1989 INT'L SOC'Y OF AiR
SAFETY INVESTIGATORS (ISASI] F. PROC. 7; see also Aage Roed, Critical Vienroints on
Cause Determination in Aircraft Accident Investigation, 1989 INT'L SOC'V OF AiR SAFETY
INVESTIGATORS [ISASI] F. PRoc. 26.
99 One argument of safety professionals on behalf of their stance is that "fault-
finding" is the job of the judicial system and that the NTSB report should not
necessarily reflect on human conduct. See Miller I and Miller II, supra note 82.
However, as the succeeding note shows, the Board institutionally has no problem
with a conduct-based analysis of accident facts.
Furthermore, if the processes of tort law are ultimately to act to improve gen-
eral safety, then safety professionals logically would favor any improvements in
the tort system's methods for reaching more accurate results. This would include
making available the safety professionals' conclusions to legal fact finders.
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duct-based causal conclusion, it is only necessary to analyze the
reported chain of causation to deduce the conduct most respon-
sible for the condition or event. This would be the investigator's
conduct-related conclusion, if it had been included.
Normally, the relevant conduct is obvious, as the following il-
lustration reveals. If the investigator reported that the accident
pilot failed to obtain a weather briefing and then flew into icing
conditions in a plane not equipped for it, a conclusion of pilot
fault in the ensuing accident is deducible from the report. This
would be the case in spite of the fact that the investigator listed
"airframe icing" as the precipitating cause. 100
Another theoretical objection to the strict comparability of re-
sults might spring from the propensity of legal claimants to
reach further up the accountability chain to locate financially
responsible tort defendants.10' However, on close inspection,
this problem reveals itself to be an illusion. First, in the usual
case, a corporate defendant would not be in court but for the
alleged fault of its employee or failure of its product. Thus, an
NTSB report with a finding of employee fault is not incompati-
ble with a court result implicating the corporate defendant.10 2
Second, the NTSB reporting method limits possible compari-
100 A 1990 NTSB Office of Field Operations memorandum to the staff appears
to have attempted to settle the matter in favor of conduct-based assessments.
Although the memorandum initially related probable cause to events in the acci-
dent sequence, it then proceeded to announce a preference for illuminating the
human contributions by adding that "[aict(s) or omissions(s) which resulted in the
accident and for which there is at least more evidence for than against." Miller I,
supra note 82, at 124 (quoting NTSB, Memorandum "Procedures" from Chief, AS-
20 to Regional Directors (Aug. 29, 1990)) (emphasis added). This specific refer-
ence to "acts or omissions" can be read to affirm the Board's acceptance of a
conduct-based analysis of accident causation.
Additional evidence in support of these conclusions is found in the Board's
provision for the Human Performance Investigator discipline. This investigator's
job is to analyze relevant human conduct, described as "operator behavior and
operator/workplace interface in relation to accident causation." NTSB, Position
Vacancy Announcement No. 90-026, Human Performance Investigator, Jan. 16, 1990
(on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
101 M.P. Papadakis supplies the following poignant illustration of potential dis-
agreement. A safety investigation may cite a mechanical or material failure as a
cause. However, a more in-depth investigation, as might be performed by a plain-
tiffs lawyer, might disclose a path to recoverable damages from the corporate
seller or maker of a defective product. Papadakis, supra note 84, at 31-32. Never-
theless, where the NTSB report of accident and the court findings concur on the
immediate issue of product failure, this signifies agreement more than it does
disagreement.
102 The safety community is not insensitive to what it calls systemic or latent
causes, which may include an employer's conduct. SeeJames Reason, Identifying
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sons to matters of causation. Thus, the comparison methodol-
ogy of this study was limited to the question of whether the act,
omission, or product of the defendant (or its employee or the
plaintiff where the issue is contributory negligence) was present
or absent in the NTSB listing of probable causes.10 3
Finally, it might be argued that since the cases that come to
trial are the hardest cases, it would be unfair to hold the judicial
system to an "expert" standard. Under this analysis, variation
between tort case outcomes and the determinations of an in-
dependent neutral expert might simply be the result of the irre-
ducible random scattering ofjudicial results. Such a distribution
can be expected when lay fact finders resolve technical ambigu-
ity. In other words, it is difficult for fact finders to wade through
the murky and sometimes highly esoteric facts and circum-
stances of the aviation accidents that come to trial, especially
where opposing experts put entirely different spins on the facts.
The random variance between court results and those of in-
dependent experts might be a natural product of the relative
indeterminacy of baffling technical facts. However, it would be
difficult to resist making the crucial argument that where the
judicial system manages to add artificial obstacles, such as a
factfinding regime that succeeds in partially "hiding the ball"
from the fact finders, this regime of expectable indeterminacy
could rightfully be characterized as indefensible.
C. RESEARCH RESULTS
The sample cases for the study were drawn from cases treated
in the continuing journal series on recent developments in avia-
tion law. This insured that cases included in the sample would
be of more than passing interest to lawyers interested in avia-
tion. 104 Cases coming into the study included those in which
the Latent Causes of Aircraft Accidents Before and After the Event, 1991 INT'L SOC'Y OF
AIR SAFETY INVESTIGATORS [ISASI] F. PRoc. 39.
103 At first blush, this methodology would seem to load variance into the analy-
sis. But this is not the case. For example, in the airframe icing example given
above, the main issue in the corresponding tort case might be the pilot's legal
responsibility for the harm. If the NTSB report lists the pilot as a cause, and if
the pilot-plaintiff lost in court on the issue of contributory negligence, this judi-
cial treatment would substantially accord with the NTSB result, notwithstanding
the reporting of other concurring causes.
104 Thus, the sampling method was not random and not particularly scientific.
(A truly random sample would have included some uninteresting cases.) The
articles included: Winstol D. Carter, Jr., Recent Developments in Aviation Case Law,
51 J. AIR L. & COM. 51 (1985); Randal R. Craft, Jr., Aviation Liability Law Develop-
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pilot or FAA employee negligence, 10 5 or a product defect, was
asserted as a claim or defense. The sample was further nar-
rowed to cases for which NTSB accident reports were available.
This eliminated accidents occurring on foreign soil or waters
and general aviation accidents in which there were no fatali-
ties. 10 6 The study criteria yielded a sample of thirty-four federal
and state cases decided between 1974 and 1992. Of the thirty-
four trial opportunities, there 'was substantial agreement be-
tween courtroom and Board causation findings in twenty-three
of the cases. 10 7 The eleven instances of variance at trial were
ments in 1990, 57J. AIR L. & COM. 1 (1991);Jonathan M. Hoffmian & Lisa Brett
Egan, Recent Developments in Aviation Case Law, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 1 (1988);
Jonathan M. Hoffman & Philip S. Harris, Recent Developments in Aviation Case Law,
58J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1992); George S. Petkoff, Recent Cases and Developments in
Aviation Law: Part I, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 1 (1990); George S. Petkoff, Recent Cases
and Developments in Aviation Law: Part 1, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 491 (1990); James C.
Stroud, Recent Developments in Aviation Case Law, 59J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1993).
105 "FAA employee" normally refers to an air traffic controller but not always.
For example, many accidents are weather-related. A frequent complaint is that
inadequate weather briefing has been given to the pilot by the FAA Flight Service
Station (FSS) specialist. For a brief description of this service, see Madole &
Silverman, supra note 14. One commentator has pointed out that the demise of
the bar of contributory negligence in most jurisdictions has opened the door for
greater implication of the FAA and the National Weather Service (NWS) in fac-
toring causation. Frederick P. Alimonti, Death by Misinformation? Governmental
Liability for Faulty FAA Weather Information, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 961 (1995).
106 The FAA is delegated responsibility for investigating minor accidents. See
supra note 89.
107 The reader familiar with "recent development" cases might wish to know
which of those cases were in actual substantial agreement with the NTSB result.
They are: In reAir Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on Aug. 2, 1985, 919 F.2d
1079 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991); Barbosa v. United States, 811
F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1987); Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1987);
Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984); Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724
F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); Barnard v. United
States, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,125 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1992); Budden v. United
States, 808 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Neb. 1992); Pettorini v. United States, 23 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 18,397 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 1992); Frutin v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 760 F. Supp.
234 (D. Mass. 1991); McGory v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio
1987); Haley v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1987); Fischer v.
United States Dep't of Transp., 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,175' (N.D. Ohio May 31,
1989); Nix v. United States, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,982 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 17,
1984); In re Air Crash Disaster at Metro. Airport, Detroit, Mich. on Jan. 19, 1979,
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 1 17,915 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 1984); Kanner v. Ross Sch. of
Aviation, Inc. 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,934 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 1984); Stewart v.
United States, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,047 (D. Idaho, Apr. 26, 1984); Rulli v.
United States, 581 F. Supp. 1502 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Air Serv., Inc. v. United States,
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,556 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 31, 1983); Insurance Co. of N. Am.
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specifically created by (i) a primary judicial result implicating an
act or omission that was excluded by the Board report, or (ii) a
primary judicial result that failed to implicate an act or omission
that was included in the Board findings. The provenance of
most observed variance was the result of either fact finder misap-
prehension of aviation facts or the misapplication of aviation
rules.
To assess the reliability of the NTSB findings, each NTSB re-
sult was appraised for conformance to a standard legal causation
analysis for foreseeability of harm based on neutral expertise.
Where the NTSB result comported with this standard, and the
result went against the principal finding in the associated tort
case, the case was registered as an instance of variance. The
NTSB result substantially met this standard in all of the eleven
trials reflecting significant differences. Therefore, it seems justi-
fied to conclude that the NTSB reports for this sample of cases
formed a passably reliable standard.
The following example illustrates how an instance of counta-
ble variance would be registered under this methodology. Gen-
erally speaking, the neutral expert examining a clear day
collision of two aircraft in a traffic pattern will use regulatory
"see and avoid" to infer some pilot fault.108 The expert would
also consider circumstantial facts that might rebut the infer-
ence. 109 Additionally, the expert would reject a conclusive pre-
sumption of pilot fault as causal. Either extreme, failing to draw
the rebuttable inference or indulging a conclusive presumption,
would exemplify an "inexpert" interpretation. One course re-
flects ignorance of the federal rule's design to place primary re-
sponsibility on the pilot; the other reflects ignorance of the
v. City of New Haven, 574 F. Supp. 373 (D. Conn. 1983); Safeco Gen. Ins. v. Davis,
No. CA 91-253, 1992 WL 103726 (Ark. Ct. App. May 6, 1992).
108 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b), supra note 29 "see and avoid"; see also infra note
139 (discussing the invariant implications of the Federal Aviation Regulation con-
cerning the pilot-in-command (P.I.C.) concept). If a clear day, mid-air collision
were not prima facie evidence of some pilot fault, the consequences of these
rules would be nugatory.
109 The expert would take the following types of facts into consideration in
deciding whether the inference of some pilot fault is rebuttable: the approach-
ing angles of the aircraft (for deciding both "right of way" and "opportunity to
see"); relative speed and size of the aircraft; sun position; visibility conditions; the
existence of air traffic control; whether the control services met a due care stan-
dard; and whether it was a single-piloted or dual-piloted aircraft (greater burden
on the dual-piloted aircraft). Unfortunately, some state substantive rules con-
cerning breach as negligence per se would not permit this analysis.
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need to examine circumstances and to balance.110 A court reso-
lution involving either of these errors, coupled with a result that
varies from the "expert" standard, would be registered as a vari-
ance case.
In this sample of thirty-four trials, eleven instances of signifi-
cant variance in result produced a trial "variance rate" of about
one-third. A more meaningful statistic would probably consist
in the ratio of final judicial results to the prediction standard
(i.e., the NTSB report). To do this, the appellate stages had to
be considered. The eleven "variance" cases included nine ap-
pellate stages. Four of these reviews corrected the trial result to
achieve agreement with the prediction standard. To offset this
marginal corrective effect, two appeals courts re-evaluated case
facts and reversed. cases that were correctly decided at trial.
Thus, the final research result consisted of a finding of signifi-
cant variance in final case outcomes in nine of thirty-four
cases-for an agreement rate of about three-fourths. This statis-
tic cannot be considered in a vacuum, however. This marginal
improvement, from two-thirds to three-fourths agreement, was
purchased at the considerable cost, both to the system and to
the parties, of a total of eleven appellate reviews. The cases, clas-
sified by principal issue, are discussed below.
1. Controller-Pilot Nexus
Controller-pilot nexus cases arise in several contexts but most
often in "midair collision" and "lost pilot" scenarios. The midair
collision cases invariably involve allegations that controller negli-
gence contributed to the collision. Of the three cases iri the
study involving midair collisions, one court invoked the- regula-
tion to impute negligence per se; this was corrected on appeal
by the use of a facts and circumstances test.
In Nakajima v. United States,"' a foreign student helicopter pi-
lot was practicing approaches at the Opa Locka Airport in Flor-
ida when his helicopter was rammed from behind by a Cessna
operated by a student and an instructor. The decedent helicop-
ter pilot's estate sued the government for failing to deliver ade-
quate warnings and air traffic control services. The trial court
110 The idea of balancing was given expression in a pilot-controller nexus case.
"[A]s a result, a balancing process is involved, i.e., the vantage point of the pilot
will be weighed against the tower's superior knowledge or awareness of the pilot's
danger." Richardson v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 921, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
111 759 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1991), revd in part, 965 F.2d 987 (11th Cir.
1992).
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found the tower controllers negligent in the issuance of warn-
ings but also found the deceased helicopter pilot, Nakajima,
contributorily negligent per se based on "see and avoid."' 2 The
court believed the decedent could not escape the command of
the regulation even though he was rammed from behind.' 13 In
contrast, the appellate court found from these facts that the rule
was clearly inapplicable, citing to some previous cases approving
a facts and circumstances test.14 Interestingly, the trial court, as
allowed by regulation and precedent, had relied heavily for
factfinding purposes on the NTSB factual report, which ex-
cluded causal conclusions. Had the trial court had access to the
Board's causal findings, the corrective appellate stage might
have been obviated.
The NTSB investigators identified the accident causes as air
traffic control error as well as the inattention of the pilots in
control of the ramming aircraft. 115 It is possible, using the legal
test for proximate cause, to confirm this result through the fol-
lowing reasoning: a clear-day traffic pattern collision of two air-
craft, where the pilots of one plane had a forward aspect view of
the other, is not reasonably foreseeable in the absence of pilot
inattention or lack of skill. There were no circumstances in this
case that would rebut the inference of negligence on the part of
the ramming pilots or of the tower operators, for that matter.
Where both the tower controllers and the pilots were inatten-
tive, their negligence, therefore, must have concurred. The pos-
sibility of a breach of any legal duty by Nakajima would, on the
other hand, be excluded by such an analysis.
Rodriquez v. United States"6 was factually similar, but the trial
result was appreciably different. A plane flown by a biennial
flight check student and an instructor rammed a plane piloted
by a solo student in the Caldwell, New Jersey, traffic pattern.
The trialcourt took a very narrow view of "see and avoid," to say
112 759 F. Supp. at 1580-81.
13 Id. at 1581.
114 Nakajima, 965 F.2d at 989. Application of the "see and avoid" rule has been
particularly problematic for the courts, and thus results are highly variable be-
tween jurisdictions and courts. For example, in the "sample" case of Colorado
Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States (not analyzed because of general concordance
in results), the appeals court found that Colorado law would have applied the per
se rule against the pilots of both colliding planes, the trial court, on the other
hand, would have applied a facts and circumstances test. 506 F. Supp. 1221, 1228
(D. Colo. 1981), affd, 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984).
115 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 1873 AUG. 31, 1987.
116 823 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1987).
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in essence that, even in the circumstances of a clear day and an
unobstructed view of approaching traffic, it could not infer any
pilot negligence. 117 Instead, the court found the tower opera-
tors negligent for inadequate warnings, and their negligence
was found as causal.118 Reconstruction of accident geometry by
experts confirmed that the occupants of the dual-piloted air-
plane had an unobstructed view of the single-piloted aircraft as
they approached it from the side and above. The Third Circuit
appellate panel, taking time to contrast New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania law on the point, noted that, in New Jersey, violation of
a regulation supplies an inference of negligence but not proof
of it." 9 The court further opined that on the facts presented, it
could infer pilot negligence as a concurring cause and, thus, re-
versed the verdict in favor of Rodriguez's estate.120 This, too,
had been the conclusion of the NTSB, which had found that
inattention on the part of the pilots figured as causes in the acci-
dent.121 Rodriquez, like Nakajima, was one of the four variance
cases corrected on appeal.
Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States122 was another midair col-
lision case. In Transco, the trial court found the controllers neg-
ligent and found no contributory negligence on the part of the
pilots involved.'2 3 In this case, two light aircraft collided while
approaching each other in a forward aspect (i.e., a forward
view) in apparently clear skies. There was evidence of controller
negligence in the vectoring 124 of one of the aircraft outside pro-
tected airspace. 125 This finding of negligence was sufficient in
the view of the court to attribute accident causation solely to the
government controller.1 26 Thus, the pilots' estates were granted
117 Id. at 742.
118 Id. at 740.
119 Id. at 739-40.
120 Id. at 742, 744.
121 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 3048 Aug. 29, 1982. The report cited only
the pilots and not the controllers except to name congested traffic pattern as a
factor. Controllers are responsible for spacing and sequencing and thus, by im-
plication, for congestion. Nevertheless, on the main issue of pilot contributory
negligence, the federal investigators and appellate panel agreed. Rodriquez, 823
F.2d at 744.
122 896 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1990).
123 Id. at 1440.
124 A controller's "vector" constitutes a verbal instruction indicating the direc-
tion the pilot is to fly.
125 Transco Leasing Corp.,,896 F.2d at 1439.
126 Id. at 1444-45.
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summary judgment on the issue of their contributory
negligence.12 7
The appellate panel, in its affirmance, noted that the Govern-
ment had failed to produce any evidence in opposition to the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In other words, the
Government was deprived of even an inference of pilot negli-
gence in the case-this, regardless of the implications of the fed-
eral regulation or of the 'circumstances of a clear day and
forward-aspect approach. 128 The court cited Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett' 9 for the proposition that avoidance of a summary judg-
ment motion required the non-movant to produce sufficient
evidence. 30 In a doubtful application of Celotex and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court said, in disregard of the
implications of the "see and avoid" rule and of the Govern-
ment's showings on all the factual circumstances of the acci-
dent, that the Government did not meet the Celotex standard.1 3 '
Furthermore, in agreeing with the plaintiffs' amended sum-
mary judgment motions, the court said that the deposition of
the Government's own expert witness supplied the plaintiffs'
proof of the absence of any evidence in opposition to the mo-
tions.13 2 The Government's expert, when asked whether he
knew of any evidence to support the contention that the pilots
127 Id. at 1456.
128 Id. at 1447.
129 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
130 Transco Leasing Corp., 896 F.2d at 1444. The concern of the Celotex court was
the nonmoving party's "complete failure of proof concerning an essential ele-
ment of... [that party's] case ..... " (evidence of exposure to asbestos), in order
to form an issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).
131 The nonmoving party's burden in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is
to come forward with "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." There is
authority for the proposition that permissible inferences from the nonmoving
party's factual averments should be "indulgently regarded." JAMES W. MOORE,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE, FEDERAL CIVL RULES 1995 PART 11 56.3 [141, at 577
(1995) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) and United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962)). Further, where there are facts from which different
inferences might be drawn; all these inferences are to be taken "against the non-
moving party and in favor of the opposing party." MooRE, 56.3 [15], at 579
(citing Sankovich v.- Life Ins. Co..of N. Am., 638 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1981)). Celotex
does not change these results. Thus, in Transco, the government arguably met
the rule of Celotex. A mid-air collision of two aircraft in clear skies must supply an
inference of some pilot negligence (see supra note 108 and accompanying text).
This inference should have been indulgently treated i.e., as creating a genuine
issue of triable fact.
132 Transco Leasing Corp., 896 F.2d at 1445.
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could have seen one another, answered "no."1 33 In contrast, the
NTSB opined that not only was air traffic control a cause, so was
at least one of the pilots.' 3 4 Although the case was essentially de-
cided as a matter of federal civil procedure, a basic misappre-
hension of aviation facts and law put it in that posture.
Other contexts for pilot-controller nexus cases are the "lost
pilot" and "controlled flight into terrain" (CFIT) cases.' 5 One
case in the study comes in under both headings. In Jatkoe v.
United States,'16 a doctor and his family had embarked on a cross-
country vacation in their light twin-engine aircraft. 3 7 Prior to
the flight, Dr. Jatkoe received a standard weather briefing that
forecast a weather front containing "low ceilings, minimal visibil-
ity, heavy precipitation and freezing rain" in his route. 38 While
traversing the front, the plane iced up and an engine that had
earlier given signs of trouble lost power. Unable to climb after
missing an approach due to inclement weather at a diversion
airport, the plane flew into high terrain. Controllers from two
different sites were attempting to supply directions to keep the
plane safe, but radio difficulties apparently prevented timely re-
ceipt and compliance. The jury concluded, as did the judge,13 9
that whatever the quantum of negligence attributable to Jatkoe,
it was superadded by that of the ATC controllers trying to help
him.
133 Id. This illustrates the absolute importance of properly preparing wit-
nesses. The answer to this question should have been "yes." After all, the planes
approached each other in a forward aspect. This constitutes "evidence" of the
ability to see one another.
134 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 3361 Oct. 27, 1982. Under the circum-
stances, NTSB investigators had to cite at least one of the pilots for either failing
to "see and avoid" or, alternatively, for violating VFR cloud clearance criteria
(i.e., maintenance of a specified distance from clouds when operating visually).
See supra note 29. The latter violation was chosen on the strength of a weather
report that showed clouds in the vicinity of the impact. What is important is that
pilot fault concurred as a cause in this accident.
135 A CFIT accident can result if a pilot in fog misjudges altitude, misconstrues
the height of terrain, or just loses situational awareness. For the latest on CFIT
and its causes and cures, see Mark L. Majikas, Helping Pilots Avoid Terrain, AIR
LINE PILOT, Aug. 1995, at 28.
136 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 1 17,833 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 1985).
137 This was the Jatkoes' return leg from Savannah, Georgia, back to their
home in Pontiac, Michigan. A well-understood factor in return trip accidents
goes under the moniker of "get-home-itis." It has been described in accident
reports.
138 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,840.
139 The court in FTCA cases may use an advisoryjury. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 39(c).
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Evidence of Jatkoe's negligence, according to the Govern-
ment case, included: (1) overloading the aircraft, (2) planning a
flight and flying into forecast and reported icing conditions for
which the airplane was not equipped, (3) continuing a flight, at
night, in adverse weather conditions in a plane with a known or
suspected engine problem, (4) continuing the flight in deterio-
rating weather despite minimal experience in the type of air-
craft, and (5) planning flight in severe weather despite
unfamiliarity with the operation of the plane's onboard weather
radar. 140 These averments were not contradicted; nevertheless,
in the court's view they did not "cause" the accident because of
the controllers' failure to exercise their "last clear chance to
avoid the accident." Adverting to the court's understanding of
last clear chance under Virginia law and to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts section 479, the court was satisfied that the doctrine
was intended to cut off Jatkoe's negligent contribution to the
events.1 4 ' This was surely a case of egregious facts won on a du-
bious legal interpretation. In contrast, the NTSB identified con-
duct-based factors in the accident attributable to both the pilot
and air traffic control.1 42
Another CFIT case coming into the study was Barber v. United
States.14 3 In this case, a pilot flying at night and in clouds, de-
140 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,837.
14' This seems to be a misapplication of last clear chance. The judge said the
doctrine, as applied in Virginia, was not necessarily intended to supersede plain-
tiffs own connection to the harm. Nevertheless, here he allowed it to do so.
Furthermore, although the doctrine is restated at section 479, it is not done ap-
provingly. Comment a makes it clear that the doctrine's use should be restricted
to cases of the defendant's (here, the ATC controller's) culpable conduct-as in
"reckless" or "intentional." Any other use so as to supersede plaintiffs own negli-
gence "is quite out of line with modem ideas as to legal cause." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 cmt. a (1965).
Arguably, the "emergency doctrine," as explained by Prosser and Keeton, supra
note 94, was more apropos to this case. Under the emergency doctrine, a de-
fendant "cannot reasonably be held to the same accuracy ofjudgment or conduct
as one who has had full opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that
the actor made the wrong decision." PROSSER AND KEETON ET AL., supra note 94,
§ 33, at 196. These ATC defendants were working under emergency conditions
to try to extricate Jatkoe from a situation he himself had created.
142 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 3-0512Jan. 12,1975. This report adhered to
the practice of attributing causation to the "conditions" of weather and airframe
icing. But the listed "factors" of the accident (i.e., helping or assisting causes),
included pilot and air traffic control. These "factors" are countable as the
Board's conduct-based causation findings. See supra note 109.
143 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 1 18,053 (D. Or. May 9, 1984). In a previous unre-
ported opinion, the court found that Barber's negligence exceeded that of the
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scended below the regulatory minimum altitude and flew into
high terrain. The court found certain controller and FAA man-
agement omissions so egregious that any pilot negligence in this
accident was overborne and thus, recovery against the govern-
ment was not barred. Plaintiffs averment was that the non-di-
rectional radio beacon that Barber was told to use that night for
commencing his Instrument Landing System (ILS)144 approach
to the airport apparently malfunctioned. There was testimony
to the effect that the controllers in the tower knew of this fail-
ure, and yet they failed to warn Barber. Apparently, relying on
erroneous indications from the radio beacon, Barber strayed
from protected airspace and into a mouna'in.
The court pointed out that a pilot should never descend be-
low the depicted initial approach altitude until receiving a glide
slope "fly-down" indication on the ILS instrument display. A
simple low frequency beacon is never satisfactory for this critical
maneuver. Barber's violation of this rule confirmed its impor-
tance. Furthermore, the Government adverted to regulations,
which, under the prevailing weather conditions, required Bar-
ber either to carry a copilot or an operating autopilot. Barber
had done neither. Under the circumstances, it would be reason-
ably foreseeable to any person holding a pilot's license that dis-
aster could strike in exactly the fashion it did. This was the
conclusion of the NTSB investigation, which, in contrast to the
court, found the accident cause to be "pilot... improper IFR
operation." 45
The controller-pilot nexus also arises in pilot loss-of-control
accidents. Although the pilot-in-command, or P.I.C., rule"4
would seem to govern in the cases where a pilot loses control of
and crashes his aircraft, suits are occasionally brought seeking to
government. That result was overturned on appeal and a new trial ordered. The
citation is the subsequent trial held by a differentjudge. Id. at 18,054.
'44 ILA is a ground-based electronic radiating system that provides final ap-
proach guidance to the pilot via the plane's instruments.
145 NTSB, BRIEr OF ACCIDENT No. 3-1043 Jan. 15, 1978.
146 This rule, codified at 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1995), essentially makes the pilot
ultimately responsible for the fate of the flight. The circuits are uniform as to its
import: where the pilot is able to affect the outcome, he has a legal duty to take
whatever action is necessary to assure safety. See, e.g., In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d
15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982); Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1982);
Coatney v. Berkshire, 500 F.2d 290, 292 (8th Cir. 1974); Bibler v. Young, 492
F.2d 1351, 1358 (6th Cir. 1974); Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226-27
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1960).
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implicate ATC. 147 The -next case in the study, Schuler v. United
States, 14 is an example of this type of suit. The pilot had taken
off in his light twin-engine aircraft from the Muskegon County
Airport in Michigan. Shortly thereafter the plane developed en-
gine problems. The pilot requested an immediate return for
landing, and the request was granted. The controllers, however,
delayed final landing clearance until they were satisfied that the
runway intended for landing was clear of aircraft. A military C-
130 was taxiing clear of the active runway at the time.
The trial court found the controllers twenty percent at fault
for the pilot's loss of control and crash on final approach. 149
The evidence showed that in lining up for landing, the pilot had
turned into the dead engine at a low altitude. This is a maneu-
ver which pilots must avoid in light twin-engine aircraft because
there is a high potential for losing control and crashing. The
dead engine is both a weight and a drag-particularly if the pro-
peller cannot be made to feather. °50 Furthermore, high power
on the good engine adds to rolling forces toward the dead en-
gine.. Therefore, an attempt to turn into the dead engine can
very easily cause an uncontrollable spiral or spin. The accident
sequence of events in this case apparently followed this pattern.
The appellate panel reversal of the trial court finding of control-
ler fault stressed the import of the pilot-in-command rule.'
The panel suggested that for all their responsibilities and duties,
controllers simply cannot fly the pilot's aircraft for him.15 2 The
pilot in command must do it. This was also the judgment of the
NTSB investigators in their report.5 5
2. FSS and NWS-Pilot Nexus
Since many general aviation accidents are weather-related, it
is not surprising that claims frequently allege inadequate
weather briefings by FSS specialists. The customary charge is
147 Even if some kinds of "see and avoid" and "CFIT" cases may, on proper
facts, properly implicate the ATC controller, it is difficult to imagine how a con-
troller's act could cause a pilot to mishandle flight controls so as to lose control
of his aircraft.
148 868 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1989),.
149 Id. at 196.
150 A technique that turns the propeller blades into the wind via mechanical or
hydraulic means from the cockpit.
15, 868 F.2d at 197.
152 Id. at 198.
155 NTSB, BRIEF oF AccIDENT No. 3-2777 June 30, 1981. The NTSB also listed
as a concurring cause "powerplant failure."
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that inadequate briefing misled or negligently failed to inform
the pilot-leading to ultimate disaster. Some suits also seek to
implicate National Weather Service (NWS) personnel for inade-
quate forecasting or faulty dissemination of reports.'"
Springer v. United States 55 was such a case. Springer's estate
brought suit, alleging controller negligence in failing to convey
current windshear conditions up the chain of command for dis-
semination to all pilots. The estate also charged negligence on
the part of NWS forecasters for failing to amend an area forecast
to warn of windshear conditions. 156
Springer had planned a cross-country flight in his light twin-
engine aircraft into cloudy, rainy weather associated with a pass-
ing warm front. Although Springer had received a weather
briefing earlier in the day, it could not be definitively deter-
mined whether he had called theFSS for an update briefing just
before flight.'" 7 If he had done so, as would have a prudent
pilot under the circumstances, he would have obtained an advi-
sory of moderate, low level turbulence. 158 Such an advisory
would have put a pilot on notice of the probable existence of
windshear.' 59 Within sixty seconds after takeoff, Springer's
plane plunged out of the low cloud bases and into the ground,
killing Springer and his passenger.
Unluckily for defendants in this case, the judge' chose to be-
lieve almost every instance of invented testimony offered by
plaintiffs' experts.' 60 For example, plaintiffs' weather expert tes-
tified to a windshear gradient .(i.e., change in wind velocity) of
45 knots over a 100 foot height between 500 and 600 feet of
altitude (the estimated height of the Springer plane's "up-
154 One commentator observes that the circuits are increasingly likely to follow
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), and regard NWS forecasting and
dissemination as subject to the discretionary function exception (DFE) (28
U.S.C. § 2680(a)) and the misrepresentation exception (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)) of
the FTCA or both. See supra note 13. Gary W. Allen, Suing the Weatherman: Doing
Something About the Weather, LAw. PILOTS B. ASS'N J., Winter 1995, at 8. For a
discussion of the exceptions, see supra note 13.
155 641 F. Supp. 913 (D.S.C. 1986), affd, 819 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987).
156 Springer, 641 F. Supp. at 915.
157 Id. at 929.
158 Id. at 931.
159 The prudent pilot expects and plans for windshear during a frontal pas-
sage, especially in the presence of a turbulence forecast. See FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS PERSON-
NEL 80, 88 (1975).
160 Springer, 641 F. Supp. at 923.
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set") .161 This hypothetical wind velocity gradient was shown by
defendant's expert to be a next-to-impossible occurrence in na-
ture. The latter, who was the director of windshear research at
the National Center for Atmospheric Research, said such a gra-
dient had "never... been observed."162 Thejudge also believed
that this next-to-impossible wind shear at 500 feet could have
been contained in an overcast sky with reported ceilings of
about 200 feet above the ground. In fact, a shear of such
strength would have literally blown the clouds away from the
shear zone, and there would have been no cloud ceilings in evi-
dence. So the case actually devolved down to a question of hav-
ing one or the other, low ceilings or a strong windshear, but not
both. (This judge chose both.)
Additionally, plaintiffs pilot expert was able to convince the
credulous judge that a frontal wind shear of this type could op-
erate to roll Springer's aircraft to an inverted position and cause
it to plunge to the ground from 500 feet of altitude.16 In fact,
only two types of windshear possess this kind of strength: (i) the
transitory "wake vortex" type of turbulence that swirls out from
beneath the wings of large transport aircraft in landing pat-
terns' 64 and (ii) convective microburst windshear-which is a
very strong gust front emanating from the bottom of some thun-
derstorms. 165 Neither of these conditions were in evidence that
day; therefore, the windshear Springer was left to contend with
consisted of simple turbulence-which admittedly can shake air-
craft. It would be very unlikely to turn one upside down though,
let alone blow it down from 500 feet to the ground.
Even if the facts were exactly as the judge had found them,
none could explain how a light plane "upset" at an altitude of
161 Id. at 931 n.5.
162 819 F.2d at 1139.
163 Id. at 932.
164 Sometimes imprecisely referred to as wingtip vortices, this kind of turbu-
lence has been blamed for many loss of control incidents. FAA, for this reason,
specifies lengthened intervals for planes following large aircraft in landing pat-
terns. For recent learning, see NTSB Special Investigation Report, Safety Issues
Related to Wake Vortex Encounters During Visual Approach to Landing, NTSB/SIR 94/
01 (1994); Tom Duke, Training to Beat Wake Turbulence, AIR LINE PILOT, Sept.
1995, at 20. Obviously, this was not a factor in Springer's loss of control.
165 See FAA, supra note 159, at 114-15. The phenomenon gets its name from
both the vertical ascent of warmer air (convection) followed by its sudden rever-
sal of direction after having cooled, in a highly localized rainshaft (micro). A
number of crashes have been attributed to microburst encounters near airports.
For recent learning on the microburst phenomenon, see William W. Melvin,
Windshear Revisited, AIR LINE PILOT, Nov. 1994, at 34.
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500 feet by windshear could not have been recovered before
crashing to the ground. One explanation would be that
Springer was not proficient in weather flying. Combined with a
turbulence encounter, which was forecast, an unproficient pilot
could become spatially disoriented and be unable to interpret
his instruments properly. Although Springer was a relatively ex-
perienced pilot with in excess of 2000 hours, he only had a little
over 100 hours of instrument time. If his instrument exper-
iences were sporadic over those 2000 hours of flying, his instru-
ment skills could have been at a minimal level for coping with
turbulence in the clouds. This was the conclusion of the NTSB
investigation, which listed as the probable cause of the accident
"pilot... spatial' disorientation." 66
Noiwest Capital Management & Trust Co. v. United States6 7 was
another FSS weather briefing case. A pilot's estate claimed that
the FSS specialists had inadequately briefed him on the possibil-
ity of icing during his flight. The pilot, Largent, and three pas-
sengers had departed the Hot Springs, South Dakota, Airport in
Largent's light twin and crashed in apparent icing conditions
shortly thereafter. Evidence was that the FSS briefers had indi-
cated to Largent in their briefings that all the conditions recog-
nizable as conducive for icing were present, i.e., low ceilings,
near freezing temperatures and precipitation. But, the briefers
failed to mention the specific word "icing" in the forecast. The
trial court found this omission to be negligent, but not the prox-
imate cause of the accident. 68 The trial court found that the
crash was not caused by icing but by pilot spatial disorientation
in the clouds (Largent was not instrument-qualified) .169 There-
fore, the court found it unnecessary to assess whether Largent's
negligence was more than slight in comparison to that of the
FSS weather briefers. 170 As an alternative finding, the court, re-
lying on the testimony of several experts, said Largent was at
fault for failing to draw the necessary conclusions regarding the
icing potential, or in consciously ignoring the briefings given
166 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 3-3576 Dec. 1, 1981.
167 828 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1987).
168 Id. at 1331.
169 Id. at 1336-37.
170 South Dakota is one of two states adopting the "more than slight" compara-
tive negligence standard as a bar to plaintiff's recovery. Christopher Curran, The
.Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule in the United States, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 317, 319 n.9 (1992).
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him. Furthermore, Largent's plane was not equipped with any
wing deicing equipment.
The appellate panel revised the factual findings, concluding
that airframe icing did figure prominently in the crash, and that
the FSS briefers were negligent. 171 It therefore remanded the
case to the trial court to make the negligence comparison of
Largent and the FSS briefers. The error of the appellate opin-
ion was not its conclusion that icing was a cause. Rather, its er-
ror was in failing to reach the understanding that Largent's
negligence in planning and flying in icing conditions without
proper equipment or instrument qualification was so unforesee-
able that any FSS omissions in the case were superseded. 172 Lar-
gent knew, or constructively knew, that conditions for icing were
present and/or forecast. He also knew that he was not instru-
ment-qualified. Telling was the testimony of Largent's instruc-
tor, who said that after observing conditions that morning, he
"would not have flown into that weather."1 73
The NTSB conduct-based causal finding was that "[P] ilot...
initiated flight in adverse weather conditions."174 The report
also listed the "condition" of airframe ice. The NTSB found the
weather forecast to be "substantially correct." Therefore, any ac-
cumulation of airframe ice was also due to pilot conduct-plan-
ning a flight into known or knowable icing conditions. The
report also concluded that the plane was improperly loaded for
overall weight and center of gravity limitations. In other words,
this was a case of pilot negligence, and the appellate court revi-
sion implicating the NWS briefers was erroneous. This was one
of the two cases in the study involving, by the NTSB standard, an
erroneous appellate reversal on the main factual issue.
3. Products Liability
The exposure of plane manufacturers to tort liability in the
United States is a point requiring little elaboration at this junc-
'7, 828 F.2d at 1333, 1342.
172 On a subsequent appeal, the court found that the judge's assessment of
Largent's negligence as "more than slight" was not clearly erroneous. Largent v.
United States, 910 F.2d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 1990).
173 828 F.2d at 1334. Furthermore, if the trial court was correct, and the cause
was spatial disorientation, then Largent was also negligent for flying unlicensed
and untrained in instrument conditions.
174 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 3-0542 Feb. 13, 1980.
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ture.175  When an airplane crashes, counsel must investigate all
potential causes, including the possibility of faulty design or
manufacture of the airplane or one of its parts. Moorhead v. Mit-
subishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc. combines an icing case with an alleged
products liability. 176 Using the NTSB analysis of black box data
along with expert testimony, the court found that the pilot had
flown into icing conditions and had then allowed airspeed to
decrease to the point that a stall developed. 7 7 The stalled air-
craft apparently went into a spin, from which the pilot was un-
able to recover, and it fell from 20,000 feet to the ground.
In a detailed analysis, the court disposed of the claim of a defi-
cient weather briefing on the part of FSS personnel. 7 , The pi-
lot had been adequately advised of the potential for icing along
the route of his flight. The facts and expert testimony also es-
tablished that the pilot was both unproficient and imprudent.
He was found sixty percent negligent for flying into icing condi-
tions unprepared, and for mismanaging the ensuing stall. The
remaining forty percent was allocated to the manufacturer for
supplying a pitot-static (airspeed measuring) system that was un-
reasonably susceptible to icing.' 79 This particular problem had
been previously identified by the Mitsubishi Company and
NTSB. Both had issued advisories to operators of the plane and
to Mitsubishi pilots.' 80 The existence of these advisories could
have been the linchpin of the company's defense, and yet they
were not offered to prove that either the pilot or the owner, or
both, were negligent in flying, or allowing the plane to be flown,
175 Commentators agree that product liability costs have decimated light air-
craft manufacturing in this country. Production has fallen from 20,000 aircraft
per year in the late 1970s to roughly 1000 annually by 1994. A recent federal
statute of repose on liability after, 18 years (the General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994)) is calculated to revitalize
the industry and create thousands of jobs, while simultaneously treating claim-
ants fairly. See Robert M. Jenney, General Aviation Needs More than Tort Reform,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 3, 1994, at 58.
176 639 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Tex. 1986), affd, 828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
177 Id. at 400. An aerodynamic stall is a sudden loss of lift associated with exces-
sive wing angle. An air disturbance occurs on the upper surface that substitutes
localized turbulence for lift. Another factor accounting for low speed stall is the
decrease in the dynamic wind pressure on the underside of the wing to a value
below that required, along with thrust, for supporting the plane's weight.
178 Id. at 395-96
179 Id. at 402.
180 Moorhead, 828 F.2d at 284.
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in icing conditions."' Flying into icing conditions in a plane
with a known dangerous icing susceptibility the antithesis of
prudence.182
Nonetheless, the court found that Mitsubishi's defective prod-
uct contributed to the accident.183 Under standard products lia-
bility doctrine, Mitsubishi's advisory to users and operators
should conceivably have supported an assumption of the risk de-
fense.'8 4 Furthermore, the pilot's planning and conducting a
flight into icing conditions should probably have been viewed as
an unforeseeable act superseding the manufacturer's connec-
tion to the harm. Even if the. pilot had not been on actual no-
tice of this important product information-which is unlikely
given the particularly notorious nature of a defective airspeed
measuring system on a "type" of aircraft-the owner and opera-
tor surely were on notice. The appellate panel, in its remand for
a reallocation of liability between the pilot and Mitsubishi, em-
braced the trial court's basic causal analysis as essentially cor-
rect. In contrast, the NTSB found the pilot's conduct was the
sole cause of the icing buildup and the ensuing crash by dint of
(1) "improper in-flight decisions or planning" and' (2) "fail [ing]
to obtain/maintain flying speed."185
Mergen v. Piper Aircraft Corp." 6 was the second of the two study
cases involving an erroneous appellate reversal of correct trial
181 The appellate court noted that the proffer was not made since the warning
information was only "advisory" in nature. Id. at 284 n.27. If the issue is reason-
able conduct, however, the proffer should have been made on the strength of the
argument that even advisories should be heeded to avert potentially life-threaten-
ing situations. It would simply not be reasonable to do otherwise.
182 Commentators have adverted to recently developed information relating to
susceptibility of the Mitsubishi design to tailplane icing. They call into question
previous reports implicating pilots involved in icing accidents. Hoff & Smith,
supra note 79, at 282. But where pilots are aware of a plane's susceptibility to
icing, regardless of the particular failure mode, prudence would dictate a policy
of avoidance.
1s 639 F. Supp. at 401.
184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965), which reads in
pertinent part, "On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known dan-
ger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this Section as in other cases of strict liability." See alsoJimmie E. Tinsley,
Assumption of Risk as Defense to Strict Products Liability Action, 31 AM. JUR. PROOF Or
FACTS 2d § 527, at 536-37 (1982).
185 NTSB, BRIEF'OF ACCIDENT No. 3-3593 Sept.. 2, 1981. Also named in this
report as a cause was "airframe ice." Pilot conduct was, however, responsible for
exposure to icing. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
186 524 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
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findings. Mergen, pilot of a light twin aircraft, crashed after ex-
periencing engine failure shortly after takeoff. Post-crash inves-
tigation showed one engine inoperative, with the propeller
feathered, and the other engine developing moderate power at
impact. The trial court was satisfied with defendants' experts'
theory of the accident-failure of the right engine, possibly
even pilot induced, followed by loss of aircraft control in
weather. The appellate panel nevertheless felt constrained to
substitute its own factual findings. After noting that the left en-
gine was developing moderate power at impact, 187 the panel
nevertheless decided it must have failed' 8 -thus arguably enter-
taining mutually exclusive constructs of the accident. To arrive
at this apparent contradiction, the appellate panel credited
some lay witness testimony about hearing an engine "quit" and
thought this must have signified a dual rather than single en-
gine failure. 8 9
Although the defendants' experts provided explanations for
lay misperceptions of engine sounds, they were unavailing in the
panel's review of the record. The panel also credited their deci-
sion to testimony concerning some engine problems the plane
had experienced in the past. But even if such evidence were
true, the appellate court's theory of simultaneous failure of both
engines, especially where the failures were asserted to be from
different causes, is highly unlikely. The odds are strongly
against it. One exception could be a power loss of an engine
followed by inadvertent pilot shutdown of the good engine, in
other words, pilot negligence. 90 Finally, the crash positional ev-
idence, showing that the plane impacted the ground almost ver-
187 Id. at 1351.
188 Id. at 1352.
189 The weather was reported "zero visibility" due to fog. Therefore, the wit-
nesses had no way of perceiving which engine they heard quit. It could just as
well have been only the right engine, which was known to have failed. On the
subject of the reliability of "eyewitness" accounts of aviation mishaps, Windle
Turley observed they should be "ranked well below physical evidence in accident
reconstruction." TuRLEY, supra note 83, at 302.
190 This is a fairly well-understood accident sequence. For example, in 1989,
the number one engine of a British Midlands B-737 partially disintegrated, and
the pilots mistakenly shut down the good engine. Evidence' of substantial aircraft
vibrations and some ambiguous engine indications were insufficient to dissuade
the British safety board from a primary finding of aircrew negligence. Board
Blames 737-300 Crash on Crew, 302 AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 22, 1990, at 147. (The
plane was actually a B-737-400.) The Board's judgment was probably correct. Ex-
perts know that a crash is not reasonably foreseeable from a single engine failure
on a twin-engine aircraft in the absence of pilot fault or lack of skill.
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tically, was more consistent with a single rather than a dual
-engine failure theory. 191
A more likely scenario is the one advanced by defendants
(and found both by the trial court and the NTSB investigators),
that there was a single engine failure followed by pilot loss of
control. Contrary to the common belief that two engines are
safer than one, this crash shows that the opposite can sometimes
be the case. Private pilots of light twin aircraft are sometimes
inadequately trained to handle a single engine failure on take-
off. This is an especially demanding scenario, and the pilot
must act quickly to counteract the aircraft tendency to rapidly
go out of control. 192 This complex set of tasks is made all the
more demanding when flying in fog because the pilot is obliged
to keep the plane right-side-up by reference to instruments.
The marginally trained pilot will probably not be equal to the
task. This, in fact, was the NTSB's conclusion: although power
loss was the "first occurrence" (i.e., the nonconduct event), the
conduct-based finding was "airspeed . . . and aircraft handling
not maintained-pilot."193 In other words, pilot loss of control.
In each of the two remaining products liability cases in the
study, the jury found the plane's manufacturer liable for a defec-
tive product. In a particularly bizarre crash case, "see and avoid"
issues, were melded with products liability issues.1'9  Edward
Cleveland attempted to take off in his Piper Super Cub from the
airport at Las Lunas, New Mexico, but only succeeded in run-
ning into a van that the airport owner had intentionally parked
in the middle of the runway. Cleveland's estate sued the Piper
Company (Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.195) for inadequate
191 The classic crash pattern associated with a complete power loss is straight
ahead furrow, other things being equal. This crash had a near-vertical impact
pattern, which is more indicative of pilot loss of control.
192 The necessary reactions usually consist of applying near maximum rudder
and aileron to counteract the rolling tendency, feathering the propeller on the
failed engine to overcome drag, and adjusting power on the good engine to
maintain a survival rate of climb.
19s NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 3338 Oct. 31, 1982. On the main issue of
interest-defective product versus pilot'negligence-the Board was clear that pi-
lot conduct was a cause, saying that the power loss was unexplained. (No
mechanical failure was found by the investigators.).
'94 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft, 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989).
195 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989). The case was remanded so as to give thejury the opportunity to properly apportion liability between those responsible for
the collision and those responsible for crashworthiness. Case facts are reported
at the second appeal, 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993).
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cockpit visibility and substandard crashworthiness. 196 Cleveland
had been conducting both glider tow operations and aerial pho-
tography with a movie camera set up in the front cockpit, and
he was attempting to fly from the rear cockpit. The airport
owner, thinking these operations were dangerous and in viola-
tion of regulations, closed the airport and stationed his van on
the runway to prevent Cleveland from taking off.' 97 The appel-
late court's holding that the plane's manufacturer could be sued
on a products liability theory for rear cockpit visibility was re-
markable for its absolute disregard of approximately sixty years
of standard aircraft design. Many dual-cockpit, tailwheel
equipped aircraft are designed to be flown from the rear cockpit
by a single pilot. Even if tandem seat "taildraggers" happen to
be more difficult to taxi, take off, and to fly from the rear seat,
where the controls are provided, it is not improper to undertake
to do so. It is necessary for the pilot to assess visibility and com-
pensate where required. 98 The logical alternative for Cleveland
in this case was simply to not fly from the rear seat.
The NTSB did not perceive the accident as one of design de-
fect but of clear pilot fault. The report cited the pilot's lack of
"visual lookout" as the cause of the accident.Y9' This result is
predicted by a standard legal analysis for the fores, eability of
harm: in the absence of pilot negligence or lack of skill, it is not
reasonably foreseeable that an aircraft taking off will crash into
an obstacle placed in clear view on the runway. Nor is it reason-
ably foreseeable that a pilot flying a tandem-cockpit aircraft
from the rear seat, would fail to make the necessary compensat-
ing actions. Not to do so would in fact be prima facie negli-
gence, which would be the sole cause of a collision.
Argubright v. Beech Aircraft Corp.2°0 also involved an appeal of
denial of defendant manufacturer's motion for judgment n.o.v.
A student and instructor had just taken off in a Beech Musket-
eer when the aircraft suddenly pitched nearly straight up,
stalled, and dove into the ground. The student's seat was found
unlocked; this was stipulated as the initiating event in the se-
quence. A rare but well-understood accident sequence begins
19 890 F.2d at 1542.
197 Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1441.
198 One common compensating technique is "weave" taxiing. This enables the
pilot to clear the intended taxi route and the initial takeoff run.
199 NTSB BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 2808 Sept. 7, 1983. The airport owner was
also cited-but not the manufacturer. Id.
200 868 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1989).
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with a pilot's unlocked seat rolling backwards during the takeoff
phase. As an instinctive action, the pilot will retain a grip on the
control wheel while sliding backwards; this of course will act to
pull the aircraft up into a climb, usually a steep one. If the
climb is not quickly countered by the pilot's either releasing the
controls, or turning them over to the other pilot, assuming one
is aboard, the airplane will climb steeply, stall, dive to the
ground, and crash. That apparently was the accident sequence
in this case.
The jury, upon the judge's instruction that the manufacturer
owed a duty to warn plane occupants of the potential danger of
the seat sliding back, found the manufacturer negligent.2 01 In
reversing the judgment on the verdict, the appellate court said
there was no duty under Texas law to warn of obvious dangers,
and it would be obvious that if an airplane seat were left un-'
202locked, it could slide back, with very dangerous consequences.
The appellate panel suggested that it must be as apparent to
pilots of airplanes as it is to drivers of automobiles that a stable
seat is a prerequisite for maintenance of proper control.20 3 The
panel, furthermore, felt constrained to observe that the manu-
facturer had indeed published in its pretakeoff checklist an in-
struction to insure the pilot seat was locked for takeoff.204 Thus,
there could be no argument remaining that a pilot would be
unaware of the need for a locked seat prior to takeoff. The
NTSB, in its conduct-based causal findings, also cited the stu-
dent pilot in this accident for improper preflight, loss of con-
trol, and failure to relinquish control.20 5
4. The Passenger-Pilot Nexus
The final variance case in the study concerned a passenger
claim of pilot negligence in a crash and survival situation. In
Beck v. Thompson,2 °6 the main issue was not the cause of the
crash, which the court found immaterial to decide the case, but
the failure of the pilot to insure that the plane had an operable
201 Id. at 766.
202, Id. at 767.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 2972 Apr. 27, 1982. The instructor was also
cited for "lack of total experience." Id. The accident investigation further dis-
closed that the seat lock was operative. Id.
206 818 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1987).
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emergency locator transmitter (ELT) aboard, °2 or alternatively,
to warn the passenger of this deficiency. The pilot and the pas-
senger survived the crash on a mountaintop but died of expo-
sure. In finding no pilot negligence on the ELT issue, the trial
court nevertheless made other findings that bore directly on pi-
lot conduct in relation to crash causation.2 0 8 These court find-
ings were examined in light of the NTSB investigative report.
First, the pilot was non-instrument rated yet undertook a long,
cross-country flight across a mountainous area, at night, and in
the middle of the winter. Not only did the pilot fail to get a
preflight weather briefing when he departed San Antonio
bound for Phoenix, he neglected to request an ATC "flight fol-
lowing." He also did not activate his radar beacon transponder,
which permits ATC to track a plane's location and course. Fur-
thermore, the plane lacked deicing equipment. 09 Finally, the
pilot had strayed 17 miles off the planned course and crashed at
an altitude over 3000 feet below the minimum safe flying alti-
tude for the area. 21 0 Arguably, had any of these acts or omis-
sions, or some of them, not been a part of the sequence, there
would have been simply no requirement for a rescue operation.
Or, had such an operation been necessary, the plane's occu-
pants arguably could have been found much more quickly.
Despite these trial findings, the court was unable to conclude
that pilot conduct in this case was either negligent per se, consid-
ering his many FAR violations, or that his conduct fell below an
ordinary standard of care. The appellate court, in contrast, had
no trouble finding pilot negligence, but the majority, over a
strong dissent, adjudged the lower court's findings as "not
clearly erroneous. "211 The dissent argued forcefully that this
crash clearly would not have occurred but for pilot fault and
that any other finding would be clearly erroneous. The dissent's
assessment concurred with the NTSB investigatory result, which
207 A radio transmitting device which automatically activates to guide rescuers.
208 818 F.2d at 1212-14.
209 As a rule, ice can be anticipated in any flight penetrating clouds, or even
haze, depending on temperature. Stipulated weather at the crash site was possi-
ble visual conditions, with a chance of "marginal" visual conditions and a slight
chance of light rime icing. These would have to be considered very marginal
conditions for a non-instrument rated pilot planning a night flight in a plane
lacking .deicing equipment.
210 818 F.2d at 1207. It is customary for pilots on cross-country flights to carry
aeronautical charts depicting the elevation of terrain.
211 Id. at 1212-19.
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cited the pilot for "continued VFR flight into adverse weather
conditions."212
D. ANALYSIs
The matching of courtroom resolutions with the results of
neutral, expert inquiry about two-thirds of the time-three-
fourths considering the appellate stages-may seem a com-
mendable achievement for the judicial system. It is possible,
therefore, to conclude that any talk of tinkering with the system
is premature. It is also conceivable that one hundred percent
agreement should not necessarily be the measure of merit in
this context because sometimes the NTSB will be wrong, and a
contradictory verdict or judgment will be correct. But such an
instance did not make itself particularly apparent in the thirteen
"variance" cases appearing in this study. (Therefore, complete
agreement would indeed have been the measure of virtue in this
particular sample of cases.)
It is also arguable that these rates of agreement represent the
upper limit of what is achievable considering the infirmities of
factual abstractionism and the ambiguity inherent in the adver-
sary presentation of technical facts and rules. But this is no ar-
gument for refusing to change those aspects of the judicial
process that stand in the way of more technically reliable out-
comes. This result is closer to being achieved where all expert
information relating to the events (also including the versions of
the parties) is made available to fact finders. One easy way to
accomplish this is to change the law to admit into evidence the
expert written opinion of the NTSB concerning accident causa-
tion.213 Another would be stronger official encouragement for
judges to employ the inquisitorial method embodied in Federal
Rule of Evidence 706, i.e., the jurist's use of her own neutral
expert. Some systemic benefits accruing from such revisions
might include a more coherent aviation tort precedential system
along with greater settlement rates.
The data can yield various interpretations. For example, vari-
ance, which has been construed as random up to now may be
the product of systematic forces. It would not be difficult, for
example, to read the data as reflecting a systematic bias in the
212 NTSB, BRIEF OF ACCIDENT No. 3-3436 Dec. 20, 1979.
213 The suggestions of the commentators (see supra Section IV) for special fo-
rums and jurisdictions are well taken. But this one fix probably has a high
enough benefit-to-cost ratio to obviate the more elaborate schemes.
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FTCA cases running against the government. Recall that this
charge was the substance of the Dilk argument.214 These thirty-
four sample cases included twenty-five claims against the govern-
ment. Eight of these claims succeeded in the sense that plain-
tiffs secured a conclusive trial judgment based on a finding of
government negligence.2 15 Seventy-five percent of these in-
stances, or six of eight, reached incorrect results according to
the NTSB investigations, i.e., the court either failed to include
pilot error as a concurring cause (Rodriquez, Jatkoe, and Transco)
or failed to eliminate FAA or NWS as a concurring cause
(Springer, Barber, and Schuler).2 1 6 Two of these trial results were
corrected on appeal (Rodriquez and Schuler). This meant that,
ultimately, the government lost in four of the six cases that by an
independent standard of neutral expertise, it should not have
lost.
These numbers are small and therefore not statistically relia-
ble; nonetheless, it is interesting to note that when controlled
for type of defendant, the data do suggest that the government,
when defending tort claims, may need to re-evaluate standards
for selection of cases for trial. 17 Thus, the important question
in this context is not necessarily whether any pro-plaintiff or
214 See Dilk, supra note 69 and accompanying text, concerning a perceived anti-
government bias on the part of the federal judiciary when handling personal
injury cases under the FTCA.
215 This statistic says nothing about government settlements or stipulations,
which are doubtless influenced by trial experience in the federal court system.
216 Norwest Capital Management & Trust was another case wherein FAA weather
briefers were found as a legal cause of the harm-although the NTSB report
found otherwise. The only reason Norwest Capital Management & Trust escaped
the final count of cases wrongly going against the government was that its final
remand resulted in a finding of Largent's negligence as being "more that slight"
in comparison to that of the briefers. Nonetheless, the government was put to
the expense of a complex trial and a lengthy series of appeals. See supra note 169
and accompanying text.
217 Priest and Klein's "selection effect theory" says that any perceived pro-plain-
tiff bias is taken account of in litigant's strategy, i.e., attorneys will select cases for
trial in such a fashion that wins will average fifty percent over the long term.
Priest & Klein, supra note 3. Recent work, however, has questioned the generality
of this theory. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4. The latters' results have
been replicated elsewhere. The Dept. OfJustice's Bureau ofJustice Statistics re-
ported the following in its National Center for State Courts project: (i) tort case
results in the 75 most* populous counties in the country, in 1991-92, averaged a
53% plaintiff win rate, but (ii) there was considerable variability in individual
case types, from a low of 26% in medical to a high of 60% in auto. Barbara
Franklin, Learning Curve, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 62, 65 (sidebar).
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anti-government bias is extant in the cases but attorney analysis
of the types of cases that should be tried.
This question is also illuminated by considering the "prod-
ucts" claimants in this sample, who did about as well against sell-
ers and makers of allegedly defective products as FTCA plaintiffs
fared against the government, viz., plaintiffs in Moorhead, Mergen,
and Cleveland (though not in Argubright), ultimately prevailed on
the central issue of a defective product-although wrongly, ac-
cording to the NTSB investigation. Thus, instead of merely re-
flecting a higher than expected rate of plaintiffs' judgments in
the pilot-controller cases, this aggregate data may reflect more
the defendant's attorney's excessive optimism.
One interesting question remains, and that is, why in the
FTCA aviation cases do plaintiffs succeed at greater rates than
predicted by theory? One would think that the findings and de-
cisions of the federal judiciary would, in general, be easier to
predict than those of juries. One explanation might lie in fun-
damental differences in the way judges and government attor-
neys (and their experts) view the outlines of the pilot-controller
nexus. The Dilk article and the case histories suggest that the
government views this nexus as analogous to a joint venture,
where one party supplies the other with suggestions for con-
duct.2 18 These suggestions are founded on considerations of the
need for one of the parties, the pilot, to get to where he wants to
go, balanced against the systemic needs of overall air traffic
safety and efficient airspace management.
In the government's view, the pilot is apparently free to adopt
or ignore these suggestions based on his best judgment given his
immediate situation.219 In fact, the decisions of the foremost au-
thority on the subject, the NTSB itself, in general approve the
government interpretation °.2 2  That is, in deciding FAA enforce-
ment actions, the NTSB does not necessarily restrict its deci-
sional scope to whether or not the pilot was confronted with an
emergency, but whether a pilot deviation from an air traffic
218 See Dilk, supra note 69.
219 It is literally true that the pilot may reject or accept controller directions.
See the "P.I.C." rule, 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1995), supra note 108 and accompanying
text. See also 14 C.F.R. § 91.123 (1995) ("Compliance with ATC clearances and
instructions"). The regulatory prerequisite is that the pilot be confronted with
emergency conditions justifying independent action.
220 The NTSB, in addition to its accident investigation and safety recommenda-
tion duties, is the reviewing agency for FAA enforcement actions against pilots for
violations. See 49 C.F.R § 821.1 (1995).
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clearance was prudent or reasonable under the circum-
stances.22 1 This view also tends to support the thrust of the
P.I.C. rule, which attempts to unify authority and
responsibility.222
But if a tort case fact finder were to analogize this nexus to
that of a user of land and her licensee or, perhaps, invitee, the
fact finder might conclude that the pilot has placed himself in
an environment "controlled" by ATC, which is then responsible
for making the environment safe or warning of dangers-with
the emphasis on "making safe." Use of the word "controller"
can actually contribute to the making of this analogy. It con-
notes superior, almost exclusive, responsibility. Thus, it is not
difficult to imagine howjurists well-schooled in the common law
can make the unfamiliar-the air traffic control environment-
familiar by analogy from the duties of a possessor of land. The
problem is that both views are right, and both are wrong. The
government's "cooperative venture" metaphor may be more fit-
ting where the pilot happens .to be better situated to appreciate
all the dangers;223 the real property metaphor is perhaps more
useful in other situations, as where the circumstances indicate
that pilot's complete reliance on ATC, when flying in instru-
ment conditions for example, was justified. 24 To the extent
thatjurists will adhere to one view to the exclusion of others and
that attorneys will fail to fully appreciate or account for this pos-
221 See Hinson v. Atkins, Docket Nos. SE-1 1928 & 11930 (NTSB Order No. EA-
4078), [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,143, at 14,689
(NTSB Feb. 3, 1994) (pilot's prudence in reading back wrong clearance excused
violation); Del Balzo v. Basset, Docket No. SE-1 1052 (NTSB Order No. EA-3844),
[1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,978, at 14,295 (NTSB Mar.
16, 1993) (pilot's reasonable reliance on co-pilot's mishearing of an instruction
excused violation); Del Balzo v. Frohmuth, Docket Nos. SE-11096 & 11097
(NTSB Order No. EA-3816), [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Av. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,966, at 14,271 (NTSB Mar. 5, 1993) (pilots' reasonable belief they were
cleared to a new altitude excused violation); and Busey v. Thayer, Docket No. SE-
9135 (NTSB Order No. EA-3380), [1989-1992 Transfer Binder] Av. L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,672 (NTSB Aug. 13 1991) (pilot's prudence in landing without radio
contact with tower, after several attempts, excused violation).
222 See supra note 146.
223 This is the "balancing" referred to in Richardson. 372 F. Supp. at 926.
224 Even when a pilot is operating under ATC control in instrument condi-
tions, there are qualifications to this rule of reliance. Recall Barber, supra note
143 and accompanying text, wherein the pilot's reliance on ATC did not justify
descending below initial approach altitude prior to receipt of a valid ILS and
nondirectional beacon signal.
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sibility, there is danger that the wrong cases will be selected for
trial.2 25
VI. CONCLUSION
The object of this Article was to elucidate two problems. One
was posed as a hypothesis: that decisional accuracy in technical
cases varies inversely with the general inaccessibility of the facts.
Intended as a palliative to this circumstance, the battle of the
experts has proven as infirm as its name suggests. It succeeds
only in transforming factual indeterminacy into ambiguity-a
reduction in decisional "degrees of freedom" to be sure-but
there remain avenues for even greater refinement. The second
problem flows from the first. In the "liberating" context of fac-
tual ambiguity, decision-makers seem only marginally more
likely to correctly resolve expert issues of liability than would be
expected by chance. Furthermore, this sample of cases also
tends to reflect that aviation litigators are continually being sur-
prised by outcomes not predictable by a neutral, expert-in-
formed interpretation. In other words, many times where the
aviation accident litigant would seem to have a meritorious case
in fact and in law, this circumstance will not necessarily be re-
flected in the legal outcome.
Litigants seem to understand that the injured tort plaintiff is a
very appealing party to the jury, and settlement strategies tend
to reflect this fact-although not adequately, apparently. Pres-
ent research also shows that judges tend to favor the injured
plaintiff, or to sanction the defalcating government, at greater
than predicted rates. The significance of these observations is
perhaps better appreciated in considering the treatment of
charged pilot fault, whether as a legal claim or defense, as a "lab-
oratory" variable. Pilot fault was offered as a defense in twelve of
the thirteen variance cases (and as a claim in one-Beck). In
every instance of claimed pilot fault but one, Nakajima, the
NTSB investigatory conclusion confirmed it. Assuming argu-
225 Another possible explanation for FTCA case outcomes would lie in the in-
herent unfairness in the contributory negligence system as it has operated in this
country. Judges could be expected to be more sensitive to this problem than
juries. Yet, in only two of the jurisdictions whose law decided a case, Springer
(South Carolina) andJatkoe (Virginia), was a contributory negligence system pur-
portedly in effect. See Curran, supra note 170, at 319 Table 1.
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endo that these NTSB judgments are not seriously in error,226
then pilot fault will figure in the usual general aviation accident.
The judicial treatments of the cases, in contrast, allowed suc-
.cessful interposition of this as a complete defense (ultimately)
in only two of the twelve cases where it was offered, Schuler and
Argubright, and as a partial defense in three, Rodriquez, Largent,
and Moorhead. Interestingly, in this subset of sample cases, the
NTSB found pilot fault as the exclusive cause in all but one,
Rodriquez, where the controllers were also cited. These results
signify, assuming some degree of representativeness, that in
many aviation tort actions where pilot negligence or lack of skill
could be established as defenses, they are not. At least it is not
as successful as would be implied by a standard of independent
neutral expertise.
For aviation tort litigators this" should suggest that a good legal
case of pilot negligence, where there are other possible accident
causes, should not necessarily be the touchstone for the selec-
tion-for-trial decision. It is not necessarily a good gauge. In the
present state of affairs, a better criterion might be a keen under-
standing of which kinds of cases a hypothesized anti-government
or pro-plaintiff outcome would be a possibility-regardless of
the strength of one's facts or the law's clarity.
The cases appearing in this study thus suggest that a defense
of pilot negligence needs to have particularly crystalline proof to
qualify the case for selection for trial. A good guide for the liti-
gator might be to relocate the bar for one's proof up to the
"clear and convincing" level for the selection-for-trial decision.
The practical effect of this would be to alter the litigant's settle-
ment value unfavorably (to reflect true risks). This may not
seem fair where the ostensible trial standard is a preponderance
of the evidence, but this appears to be the realpolitik of aviation
torts at the present time. This strategy might also contribute to
some stabilization of precedent and a possible increase in settle-
ment rates. Note that this is a substitute strategy in lieu of ad-
mission of NTSB conclusions as evidence or of greater
courtroom use of the neutral expert, under the rules of
evidence.
226 An "anti-pilot" bias on the part of the NTSB is probably not the case. First,
there would be no theory of which I am aware to account for it. Second, as
discussed, each pilot-related NTSB finding in this study conformed fairly closely
to results producible by a legal causation analysis.
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Subsidiary strategies for prosecuting those cases selected for
trial may revolve around insuring that counsel are competent:
(1) to understand the nuances of aviation accident "facts" in or-
der better to discern which rules are implicated if any; (2) to
properly prepare experts for testimony-including factual avia-
tion inferences that would be allowable to the expert;22 7 (3) to
clearly convey the proper theory connecting the alleged pilot
fault to the harm where it is an issue-along with acceptable
theories excluding other causes; and'(4) to work with aviation
experts as an expert, i.e.,, the adroit authority who can summon
forth from both friendly and adverse experts the winning tech-
nical interpretations. This is a possible formula for releveling
the playing field.
227 Recall Transco, 896 F.2d at 1435. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
In Transco, defendant's expert said that he knew of no "evidence" that the collid-
ing pilots could have seen one another, even though they approached each other
in a forward aspect in apparently clear conditions.
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